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Pleading for Justice: Why We Need a More Exacting
Federal Criminal Pleading Standard
Charles Eric Hintz*
Under the existing system of pleading in the federal courts, criminal
indictments are subject to significantly less scrutiny than civil complaints.
Unlike complaints, indictments can include strikingly little factual detail
and, instead, may rely on conclusory and legalistic allegations. In previous
work, I argued that that pleading balance is misguided as a matter of law,
without evaluating normative and policy arguments. I observed, however,
that if we are to retain a pleading regime that is legally questionable,
those arguments should provide robust support for that regime.
This Article, accordingly, takes up the question of what the normative
and policy considerations say about our existing pleading system, and it
concludes that those factors counsel powerfully in favor of raising the
criminal pleading standard to at least align with the civil standard. Doing
so would generate a host of benefits for criminal defendants and the
justice system, including: improving defendants’ access to information;
reducing informational asymmetry between the parties; giving
defendants an effective method of raising merits challenges to
prosecutions; promoting greater clarity in the law; preventing overly
aggressive, wrong, or capricious prosecutorial positions; protecting
against erroneous guilty pleas; clarifying the scope of criminal cases; and
helping to correct a problematic disparity between the protections
criminal and civil defendants receive. Further, there are few downsides or
drawbacks to such a reform. Thus, this Article seeks to show—and to
persuade the powers that be—that the time has come for change.

* Copyright © 2022 Charles Eric Hintz. Eric Hintz is a practicing attorney and primarily
wrote this Article while serving as a Quattrone Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania
Carey Law School. I would like to thank the following people for their helpful input
related to this project: my colleagues at the Quattrone Center, especially Paul Heaton
and Seema Saifee; Melvin Otey; and the participants in the Fall 2020 Quattrone Center
Advisory Board Meeting, the Spring 2021 Penn State Law Review Symposium, and the
July 27, 2021 Penn Law Faculty Ad Hoc Workshop. The views stated in this Article are
my own, and none of the foregoing expressions of gratitude are meant to suggest their
endorsement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our current federal pleading system, most counterintuitively,
subjects criminal indictments to significantly less scrutiny than civil
complaints.1 Under the prevailing interpretation of the Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure governing criminal pleading, Rule 7(c), conclusory
indictments that merely parrot the language of a statute are often
entirely sufficient. Yet the civil pleading Rule, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), has been construed to require particularized factual
allegations and to prohibit “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”2
In recent work, I argued that this balance between our civil and
criminal pleading standards is misguided as a matter of law.3 Based on
an examination of legal, historical, and archival sources, I concluded that
the drafters of Rule 7(c) designed the Rule to be at least as stringent as
Rule 8(a) and that the original design should control today.4
One of the implications of that, I observed, was that it made policy
arguments critical.5 If we are to retain a legally questionable pleading
regime, then that regime should at least be strongly supported by
normative and policy considerations.6 But I suggested that those
considerations might well favor changing the criminal pleading
standard in line with my legal argument.7
Nevertheless, to permit a complete analysis of the legal issues, my
previous research specifically put aside the question of whether
strengthening the criminal pleading standard to at least align with the
civil pleading standard is warranted as a normative matter.8 This
Article, therefore, begins where my previous research ended.
Considering that unanswered question, however, leads to precisely the
same conclusion I suggested in my earlier work: we should raise the
criminal pleading standard.9
To begin, doing so would generate a host of benefits. First, raising
the criminal pleading standard would significantly improve defendants’
access to information about the case against them before trial. Second,
1 See Charles Eric Hintz, A Formulaic Recitation Will Not Do: Why the Federal Rules
Demand More Detail in Criminal Pleading, 125 PENN ST. L. REV. 631, 633–43 (2021).
2 Id. at 633 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
3 See id. at 635–36, 692–93.
4 See id. at 635–36, 643–80, 692–93.
5 See id. at 636, 693.
6 See id.
7 See Hintz, supra note 1, at 636, 693.
8 See id. at 636 n.18.
9 See id. at 635–36, 692–93.
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it would begin to correct the government’s substantial informational
advantage over criminal defendants. Third, it would create a robust
mechanism for defendants to challenge the merits of the prosecution’s
case. Fourth, it would lead to greater clarity in the criminal law. Fifth, it
would prevent prosecutors from adopting overly aggressive, wrong, or
capricious positions. Sixth, it would reduce the chance that innocent
defendants would plead guilty. Seventh, it would define the scope of the
charges and proceedings, thereby guarding against double jeopardy
violations. And finally, it would help to eliminate a problematic
imbalance between the protections that civil and criminal defendants
receive.
In addition, there are few valid concerns or drawbacks to
augmenting the criminal pleading standard. Objections could or have
been raised, such as that amplifying the criminal pleading standard
would: increase the burdens of criminal litigation; be improper because
of the difficulty of amending criminal pleadings; require the government
to reveal sensitive information; let guilty defendants go free; or be
unnecessary to protect criminal defendants. But as explained below,
those objections are overblown or otherwise unsound.
As I indicated in my previous work, other commentators have
raised or suggested policy-oriented arguments—and good ones—in
favor of amplifying the criminal pleading standard.10 But present
scholarship generally discusses the criminal pleading issue in service of
broader objectives and/or does not comprehensively examine it. This
Article, therefore, is designed to offer a more focused and complete
analysis of why the criminal pleading standard should be raised to, at
minimum, align with the civil standard as a policy and normative matter.
And in performing that analysis, it draws on, synthesizes, and builds
upon arguments from the existing literature.
This Article’s analysis proceeds in the following way. Part II
provides a brief overview of our federal pleading jurisprudence. Part III
then describes the benefits of raising the criminal pleading standard.
Part IV discusses potential objections to my argument and explains why

10 See id. at 635–36, 693; see, e.g., James M. Burnham, Why Don’t Courts Dismiss
Indictments?, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 347, 348–54, 357–62 (2015); Russell M. Gold, Carissa
Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607,
1612–13, 1632–33, 1640–44 (2017); Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal
Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 40–41, 55–57, 87–88 (2014); Robert L. Weinberg,
Applying the Rationale of Twombly to Provide Safeguards for the Accused in Federal
Criminal Cases, 7 ADVANCE 45, 49–52 (2013) [hereinafter Weinberg, Applying Twombly];
Robert L. Weinberg, Iqbal for the Accused?, CHAMPION, July 2010, at 29–32 [hereinafter
Weinberg, Iqbal].
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they are unavailing. Finally, Part V explores some of the implications of
this Article’s conclusion.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL PLEADING LAW
To permit a fully informed discussion of the criminal pleading
standard, it is important to begin by reviewing the current state of
federal pleading law. Accordingly, this Part offers a brief overview of
criminal and civil pleading under the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil
Procedure.11
Federal criminal pleading typically consists of a pleading document
called an indictment or information.12 That document generally sets out
the allegations that the prosecution will seek to prove at trial, and under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), it “must be a plain, concise, and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.”13 If the indictment fails to meet the strictures of Rule 7(c), the
defendant can seek its dismissal “for ‘lack of specificity’ under Rule
12(b)(3)(B)(iii) or ‘failure to state an offense’ under Rule
12(b)(3)(B)(v),” thereby bringing an early end to the case or, at
minimum, requiring the prosecution to seek a new indictment that
complies with Rule 7(c).14
As interpreted, however, Rule 7(c) is not much of a limitation. The
Supreme Court has concluded that “[w]hile detailed allegations might
well have been required under common-law pleading rules, they surely
are not contemplated by Rule 7(c)(1).”15 And it has repeatedly

11 I describe the current state of federal pleading law at some length in my previous
work. See Hintz, supra note 1, at 636–43. Given the topical similarity of this Article,
some repetition in setting the stage here is inevitable. But I have endeavored to
minimize that and tailor the following discussion as much as possible.
12 See id. at 639–40. “‘An indictment is a criminal charge returned to the court by a
grand jury,’ whereas ‘[a]n information is a criminal charge prepared by the prosecutor.’”
Id. at 640 n.43 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 121 (4th ed. 2021)). Much of the discussion in this Article relating to
indictments is applicable to informations. My focus, however, will primarily be on
indictments because indictments are the default charging document, see, e.g., FED. R.
CRIM. P. 7(b), they are used in the overwhelming majority of cases, see infra note 248 and
accompanying text, and informations are only filed if the defendant has agreed to that
method of charging (often as part of a guilty plea), see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b); 1 IAN M.
COMISKY, LAWRENCE S. FELD & STEVEN M. HARRIS, TAX FRAUD & EVASION ¶ 5.01[2] & n.17
(2021).
13 Hintz, supra note 1, at 640 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1)).
14 Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)).
15 Id. at 641 (quoting United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 110 (2007)).
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emphasized that “an indictment parroting the language of a federal
criminal statute is often sufficient.”16
In practice, what that means is that exceedingly vague and legalistic
criminal pleadings can withstand Rule 7(c)’s scrutiny and allow
prosecutors to bring a case to trial.17 Take, for example, the following
indictment:
On or about the 13th day of July, 2007, in Shannon County,
within the Eastern District of Missouri, the defendant,
KARRIE L. GULER,
knowingly did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede,
intimidate, and interfere with Teresa McKinney, a Ranger with
the National Park Service, while she was engaged in her
official duties, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 111.18
That indictment essentially just regurgitates the relevant language of 18
U.S.C. § 111, which subjects to criminal liability anyone who “forcibly
assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
[statutorily designated] person . . . while engaged in . . . official duties.”19
And it includes effectively no detail about the wrongful conduct at issue.
It does not, for instance, reveal that the defendant was charged for
kicking a park ranger in the chest while being placed in a patrol car after
rangers were called to her campsite about a domestic disturbance.20 Yet
this indictment fully satisfies Rule 7(c) anyway.21 “It is difficult,” as one
commentator put it, “to imagine a lower standard.”22
On the civil side, the pleading process is nominally similar to that
in criminal cases.23 It involves an initial pleading document, called a
complaint, in which the plaintiff sets out the substance of his claim(s)
against the defendant.24 That document must satisfy Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires that pleadings contain “a short and
16 Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 109; see Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1953).
17 See Hintz, supra note 1, at 634 & n.6.
18 United States v. Guler, No. 1:07CV130 HEA, 2007 WL 4593504, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
21, 2007); see also Hintz, supra note 1, at 634 n.6.
19 18 U.S.C. § 111(a); see also Hintz, supra note 1, at 634 n.6.
20 See United States v. Guler, 295 F. App’x 861, 862 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);
Guler, 2007 WL 4593504, at *2–4.
21 See Guler, 2007 WL 4593504, at *5.
22 Burnham, supra note 10, at 356.
23 See Hintz, supra note 1, at 637, 639–40.
24 See id. at 637.
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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” or else it is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”25
But the prevailing interpretation of Rule 8(a) differs substantially
from that of Rule 7(c).26 Although the Supreme Court originally
interpreted Rule 8(a) to be quite lenient, it ultimately replaced that
interpretation, in the 2007 and 2009 decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, with a much more exacting one.27 Those
opinions made clear that, under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” rather
than “labels and conclusions,” “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement,’” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”28 Indeed,
the Supreme Court emphasized that conclusory allegations are to be
essentially disregarded in evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint.29
And in marked contrast to the criminal pleading standard, courts
regularly proclaim that a civil “complaint must do more than merely
parrot the contours of a cause of action.”30
In practice, moreover, courts have applied Rule 8(a) much more
strictly than Rule 7(c), requiring a fair amount of factual detail. For
example, they have discounted as “conclusory” allegations such as: that
the defendants knew about a teacher’s sexual assault and harassment of
a student before a specified date;31 that the defendants transferred the
plaintiff, who was a prisoner, to another state that did not provide
stamps to indigent prisoners to prevent him from communicating;32 that
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 12(b)).
See id. at 641.
27 See id. at 637–39.
28 Id. at 638–39 (alterations in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)).
29 See Hintz, supra note 1, at 639; see, e.g., Capax Discovery, Inc. v. AEP RSD Invs.,
LLC, 285 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585–86 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[T]he court discounts legal conclusions or ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements[.]’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
30 Hintz, supra note 1, at 634 & n.6 (quoting Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 13–14 (1st
Cir. 2019)); accord, e.g., Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591, 610 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(“[W]e are not required to credit a bald legal conclusion that is devoid of factual
allegations and that simply parrots the terms of the statute.”); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d
574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We understand the Court in Iqbal to be admonishing those
plaintiffs who merely parrot the statutory language of the claims that they are pleading
(something that anyone could do, regardless of what may be prompting the lawsuit),
rather than providing some specific facts to ground those legal claims, that they must do
more.”).
31 See S.W. v. Clayton Cnty. Pub. Schs., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
32 See Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 2010).
25
26
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the plaintiff, also a prisoner, “was transferred to segregation for filing
grievances”;33 that the defendant “bore ill will and spite toward [the
plaintiff], and personally communicated that to [him]”;34 that the
defendant hired a person “substantially younger” than the plaintiff;35
and that the defendants released “hazardous chemicals” that caused the
plaintiff “to have illnesses” and “interference of thoughts.”36
In short, the criminal pleading standard under the governing
interpretation of Rule 7(c) is quite lax, allowing the parroting of broadly
worded statutory language. Yet the civil pleading standard, under the
prevailing reading of Rule 8(a), requires much more and is not satisfied
unless descriptive factual allegations are provided.
Finally, it is worth noting that this balance in pleading standards is
well-established.37 As this Part indicates, it is supported by decisions of
the Supreme Court.38 Furthermore, lower courts have repeatedly
rejected arguments to strengthen the criminal pleading standard.39 And
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules—the main rulemaking body
for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—rejected a 2016 proposal
to align the criminal and civil pleading requirements.40 Thus, our
existing pleading system has received the imprimatur of the primary
legal authorities in command of that regime.
III. THE BENEFITS OF STRENGTHENING THE CRIMINAL PLEADING STANDARD TO
AT LEAST ALIGN WITH THE CIVIL STANDARD
Our current pleading system requires essentially nothing of
criminal pleadings, and much more of civil ones. Yet despite being wellestablished, that system cannot be justified on normative or policy
grounds. Rather, those considerations suggest powerfully that Rule 7(c)
should be altered to demand at least as much factual detail as Rule 8(a).
The primary reason for that conclusion, and the reason I address in
this Part, is that doing so would offer significant benefits to defendants
and the federal criminal justice system more generally. Specifically,
alignment would: (A) significantly improve criminal defendants’ access
Evans v. Guilford Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:13CV499, 2014 WL 4641150, at *4 (M.D.N.C.
Sept. 16, 2014).
34 Hamann v. Carpenter, 937 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2019) (second alteration in
original).
35 Cauler v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 654 F. App’x 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2016).
36 Marenco v. Mercy Hous., Case No. 18-cv-03599-LB, 2018 WL 4008405, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Jul. 27, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4005385, at *1 (Aug. 20, 2018).
37 See Hintz, supra note 1, at 634–35, 641–43.
38 See id. at 634, 638–41.
39 See id. at 634, 641–42.
40 See id. at 634–35, 642–43, 642 n.63.
33
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to information about the case against them; (B) help to correct the
government’s substantial informational advantage; (C) offer defendants
a meaningful opportunity to challenge the merits of their case; (D)
promote greater clarity in the criminal law; (E) prevent prosecutors
from adopting overly aggressive, erroneous, or capricious positions; (F)
limit false guilty pleas; (G) define the scope of criminal cases for double
jeopardy purposes; and (H) help to eliminate a problematic imbalance
between the protections civil and criminal defendants receive. I will
discuss each of these benefits in turn.
A. Alignment Would Improve Defendants’ Access to Information
About the Case Against Them
The first reason why aligning the criminal and civil pleading
standards would be normatively beneficial is that criminal defendants
presently have limited opportunities to obtain information about the
case against them, and strengthening the criminal pleading standard
would significantly improve their access to such information.
To start, there is currently no single document that defendants can
rely on to provide effective guidance about the substance of the
government’s claims. The main documents that might serve that
purpose are the indictment, the bill of particulars, and the criminal
complaint. But none of those actually does so.
Beginning with the indictment, it has little informational value for
all the reasons set forth above. In particular, Rule 7(c) permits the
government to plead using the language of the statute, meaning that the
indictment may consist of only opaque and generalized descriptions of
the charges.41 In other words, the defendant can only rely on a criminal
pleading to provide minimal information, such as that the government
alleges she violated the terms of a particular statute at some “time and
place (in approximate terms).”42
Bills of particulars are comparably problematic. Their role is to
offer “details of the charges” if the indictment, though legally sufficient,
does not provide enough information “to enable a defendant to prepare

See supra Part II.
Burnham, supra note 10, at 356 (citation omitted); cf. Michelle Kallen, Plausible
Screening: A Defense of Twombly and Iqbal’s Plausibility Pleading, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT.
257, 285 (2010) (“While skeletal pleadings give notice to the defendant as to the
existence of the suit, they may not provide sufficient detail to allow the defendant to
prepare an appropriate response or defense strategy. Without more details in the
complaint, the defendant has no way of knowing what is important in the suit and what
is not.”).
41
42
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adequately for trial.”43 But as I noted in my previous work on this
subject:
[B]ills of particulars do little in practice. First of all, several
decisions have indicated that the test for whether a bill should
be granted is quite similar to the test for whether an
indictment is sufficient, and others have found bare-bones or
nonspecific indictments adequate to render a bill
unnecessary. Additionally, a bill of particulars will generally
be denied if the defendant had access to information about his
case through other means (for example, court filings and
hearings, discovery, personal observations), even if those
means do not specify the government’s allegations or only
present information about them indirectly, haphazardly, close
to trial, or in a burdensome manner. Moreover, whether to
grant a bill is left to the trial court’s broad discretion, and a
denial will not be overturned unless the defendant can show
prejudice and/or surprise as a result.44
Even beyond that, courts often indicate that a bill of particulars need not
reveal the government’s evidence or its theory of criminal liability.45 So,
in short, bills of particulars are an insufficient source of information
about the government’s claims because they are not obtainable as a
matter of right, are subject to standards that are unfavorable to
defendants, and even when ordered, may not provide broad insights
into the government’s case.
The criminal complaint is likewise of limited utility. Although in
theory it could be informative, given that it is used to persuade a
magistrate of the existence of probable cause to detain the defendant,46
LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 130.
Hintz, supra note 1, at 686 (footnotes omitted); see also Robert G. Morvillo, Barry
A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Balter, Motion Denied: Systematic Impediments to White Collar
Criminal Defendants’ Trial Preparation, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 173–76 (2005)
(describing myriad limitations on and the infrequency with which courts grant bills of
particulars).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 715 F.2d 1447, 1449 (10th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Davis, No. 3:20-CR-0575-X, 2021 WL 63345, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2021);
United States v. Brown, No. 15-4067-3-CR-C-SRB, 2017 WL 11501176, at *2 (W.D. Mo.
May 15, 2017); United States v. Nelson, No. CR. 11-40037, 2011 WL 2160471, at *1
(D.S.D. June 1, 2011); United States v. Long, No. 06-CR-2, 2006 WL 689125, at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 17, 2006); United States v. Chrysler, No. 96-CR-134, 1996 WL 377078, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. July 5, 1996); LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 130; Morvillo et al., supra note 44, at
173, 175. But cf. United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]
defendant is not entitled to know all the evidence the government intends to produce
[by way of a bill of particulars], but only the theory of the government’s case.” (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
46 See LEIPOLD, supra note 12, §§ 41–42; see also Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214,
224 (1965); cf. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958) (“It does not avail
43
44
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it suffers from serious limitations. No complaint is necessary at all if an
indictment is returned before arrest (or before a complaint is required),
since the indictment itself establishes probable cause.47 And even in
cases in which there is a complaint, there is no requirement that the
complaint and the indictment ultimately charge the same offense.48 In
other words, defendants cannot rely upon criminal complaints to
provide any guidance in many cases and only uncertain guidance in
many others.
Of course, there are potential mechanisms for gleaning information
about a case other than formal, streamlined documents. In particular,
defendants might attempt to use standard pretrial hearings, pretrial
motions practice, discovery, and conversations with the government as
information-gathering tools. But those mechanisms, like the documents
described above, also come up short.
The standard pretrial hearings consist of the initial appearance, the
preliminary hearing, and the arraignment. None, however, can be
counted on to fully inform defendants.
The initial appearance and preliminary hearing are similar, earlystage proceedings that generally involve a determination of whether
there is probable cause to hold and proceed against the defendant.49
Because those proceedings are used to assess probable cause, they are
theoretically capable of providing defendants with information about
the government’s allegations, similar to the criminal complaint. Also
like the complaint, however, no probable cause determination is
necessary if an indictment has been returned first, and indeed,
prosecutors—who are well aware that early proceedings could “be a
useful method for learning about the prosecution’s case”—“may decide
to obtain an earlier indictment precisely to avoid revealing certain
features of [their] case too early in the process.”50 Moreover, if the initial
appearance and preliminary hearing are held before an indictment has
the Government to argue that because a warrant of arrest may be issued as of course
upon an indictment, this complaint was adequate since its allegations would suffice for
an indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c).”); United States v. Hill, No.
10-CR-191A, 2012 WL 912948, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2012) (denying a motion for a
bill of particulars because “[t]he charges in the Superseding Indictment, along with the
281 page affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Complaint, and the discovery
materials provided by the government, clearly inform the defendant of the essential
facts of the crimes charged”).
47 See LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 41.
48 See id. § 71; cf., e.g., United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 2004)
(anticipating that an indictment might “plead[] different charges from those in the
complaint”).
49 See LEIPOLD, supra note 12, §§ 71, 91.
50 Id. § 91; see also Meyn, supra note 10, at 61 & n.165.
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been filed, the specific charges might “change once the case is presented
to the grand jury.”51
To be sure, unlike the preliminary hearing, the initial appearance:
is necessary even if an indictment has been returned beforehand;52
demands that the defendant be informed of “the complaint against
[them], and any affidavit filed with it”;53 and requires (or leads to) a
determination of pretrial release,54 which is based on, inter alia, “the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged” and “the weight of the
evidence against the person.”55 But none of that necessarily makes the
initial appearance particularly informative. First of all, the initial
appearance is viewed as so informal and administrative that defendants
may not even need to have an attorney present.56 Additionally, in many
cases—such as those involving an arrest on indictment—there may be
no complaint or affidavits to inform the defendant about.57
Furthermore, although pretrial release litigation might offer some
information, a full hearing focused on pretrial release will only be held
where detention is a possibility (rather than just conditional release or
release on bond), which only happens in limited circumstances.58 Even
full detention hearings, moreover, are often informal, are not supposed
to function as a discovery device, and generally involve a limited

51 LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 71; see Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and
Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 760 n.317 (2008).
52 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a), 9(c)(3); LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 71 n.18.
53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1)(A).
54 See id. R. 5(d)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3142; United States v. Cox, Case No. 1:18-cr-00083HAB-SLC, 2019 WL 6318407, at *3 & n.1 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2019); LEIPOLD, supra note
12, § 71.
55 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
56 See United States v. Portillo, 969 F.3d 144, 160–61 (5th Cir. 2020); see also LEIPOLD,
supra note 12, § 91 (describing the initial appearance as “a brief, non-adversarial
proceeding that takes place shortly after the arrest”).
57 See LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 41; cf. United States v. Turner, 365 F. App’x 918, 926
& n.11 (10th Cir. 2010) (indicating, in a case where the defendant was “indicted before
his initial appearance,” that the district court could use an indictment to satisfy the
requirement of informing the defendant of “the complaint against [them], and any
affidavit filed with it”); United States v. Houston, Criminal Action No. 3:13-10-DCR, 2013
WL 5595405, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2013) (“[S]ince the defendant was already in
federal custody awaiting trial on Count One when the Grand Jury returned the
Superseding Indictment which added Count Two, there was no need for a criminal
complaint or arrest warrant.”).
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(f). A detention hearing will not be held unless certain
crimes are at issue or there is “a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee” or “will
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to
threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.” Id. § 3142(f).
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presentation and assessment of the case.59 As one scholar has
explained:
[C]ourts tend not to look at the strength of the evidence
against a particular defendant in making their detention
determinations because of the nature of the detention
proceedings: they are usually relatively quick, not governed
by the rules of evidence, occur at an early stage in the
proceedings when the judge and the parties have incomplete
information (it is not uncommon for a defendant to be
represented by a “duty” defender or to meet his or her
permanent attorney for the first time at or immediately before
a detention hearing), and judges are hesitant to turn a
detention hearing into a miniature trial on the merits.60
Finally, the government does not necessarily need to focus on the
strength of its case in pretrial release litigation because other factors are
relevant—like the danger posed to the community by release—and for
some crimes, the indictment alone creates a presumption that the
defendant should be detained.61 And as a corollary to that point, the
government can always avoid sharing information by simply presenting
a weaker pretrial release case.62

See, e.g., United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 321 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Martir,
782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206
(1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Flanders, Crim. No. 2010-29, 2010 WL 4054442, at *6
(D.V.I. Oct. 15, 2010); United States v. Kelly, Case No. 09-6037-RSR, 2009 WL 10698204,
at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2009).
60 Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposal for Defensive
Summary Judgment in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 664 (2011).
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), (g); see, e.g., Smith, 79 F.3d at 1210; United States v.
Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 118–20 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Boutros, Criminal No. 19mj-00264, 2019 WL 6877756, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2019); United States v. Scott,
Criminal Action No. 18-112-05 (RMC), 2019 WL 2526401, at *2–3 (D.D.C. June 19, 2019);
cf., e.g., United States v. Castaneda, Case No. 18-cr-00047-BLF-1, 2018 WL 888744, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2018) (“‘[T]he weight of the evidence [factor] is the least important,
and the statute neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination of guilt.’ Evidence
of guilt is relevant only in terms of the likelihood that the defendant will fail to appear
or will pose a danger to the community.” (citations omitted)).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Hitselberger, 909 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The
weight of the evidence against Mr. Hitselberger is difficult to assess at this point, as much
of the evidence is classified and has not been produced to the court. . . . The history and
the characteristics of Mr. Hitselberger—especially his past conduct—are what is chiefly
at issue here.”); cf., e.g., Boutros, 2019 WL 6877756, at *6 (“Neither the Government nor
Defendant addressed the weight of the evidence concerning the underlying criminal
complaint, and the Court has no basis to conclude whether the weight of the evidence is
strong or weak for those alleged offenses.”); United States v. Kiff, 377 F. Supp. 2d 586,
594 (E.D. La. 2005) (“The government does not argue that the weight of evidence against
Gilbert supports her detention. The government argues that Gilbert is a flight risk
59
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As for the arraignment, it provides even less information than the
other two hearings. The arraignment entails: “(1) ensuring that the
defendant has a copy of the indictment or information; (2) reading the
indictment or information to the defendant or stating to the defendant
the substance of the charge; and then (3) asking the defendant to plead
to the indictment or information.”63 In other words, it only necessarily
provides the defendant with as much information as the indictment,
which need not be much.
Turning to pretrial motions practice, such practice could serve as
an effective information-gathering device for defendants by requiring
the government to offer comprehensive arguments defending its
position and encouraging robust judicial scrutiny and discussion of
those arguments.64 Yet it too fails to reliably offer insights into the
merits and substance of the case.
To start, a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment based on a
failure to satisfy the pleading standard need not generate an informative
prosecutorial or judicial response, given the low bar for indictment
sufficiency. That point is illustrated well by the following account
provided in a defendant’s unsuccessful argument in the D.C. Circuit
challenging his indictment:
On July 14, 2016, the grand jury returned a one count
indictment charging Appellant with Threats against a Federal
Law Enforcement Officer, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§115(a)(1)(B). The indictment read:
On or about June 19, 2014, within the District of
Columbia, defendant JEFF HENRY WILLIAMSON
did threaten to assault and murder a Federal law
enforcement officer, that is, Brian Schmitt, a Special
Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with
intent to retaliate against such Federal law
enforcement officer on account of the performance
of his official duties.
On September 3, 2014, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress
Evidence and/or Motion to Dismiss Indictment in [sic] which,
among other claims, contended that the indictment was
insufficient. . . .
On September 13, 2014, the United States filed an opposition
to this motion to dismiss. With respect to Appellant’s claim
because after her alleged crimes she traveled to Mississippi, purportedly because of the
FBI’s investigation.”).
63 FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(a).
64 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1632–33, 1641–42.
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that the indictment was insufficient, the government merely
replied:
The indictment contained a plain, concise, and
definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense and complied with Rule
7(c)(1). An indictment is sufficient when it sets
forth each element of the crime that it charges,
points to the relevant criminal statute, and alleges
that on a specific date, the defendant committed that
crime.
....
On October 20, 2014, the District Court issued a lengthy
[opinion that mostly addressed other issues]. The District
Court did however generally address Appellant’s claims
concerning the sufficiency of the indictment in a section
entitled Motion for Bill of Particulars:
[Stating, after setting out the defendant’s
arguments:] An indictment is sufficient when it sets
forth each element of the crime that it charges,
points to the pertinent criminal statute, and alleges
that on a specific date the defendant committed the
crime.
...
The Indictment here is sufficient as it sets forth the
elements of the crime, points to the pertinent
statute, and alleges that on a specific date Mr.
Williamson committed the crime. Further, the
Government already has provided full discovery to
Mr. Williamson. Mr. Williamson’s motions to
dismiss the Indictment due to lack of particularity
and/or to require the Government to file a bill of
particulars are denied.65
Other pretrial motions practice likewise can be of little
informational value. First of all, as discussed in more detail below,
federal criminal procedure does not provide for a summary judgment
mechanism, meaning that that source of informative litigation over the
merits simply does not exist.66 Furthermore, although motions for bills
of particulars and discovery motions are about ensuring that the
65 Brief of Appellant at 16–19, United States v. Williamson, 903 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (No. 15-3018) (citations omitted); see also Williamson, 903 F.3d at 130–32
(concluding that the indictment in this case was sufficient).
66 See infra notes 114–117 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Gold et al., supra note
10, at 1610, 1635–37, 1640, 1648–50.
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defendant possesses certain information, litigation over such motions
necessarily focuses on the information that the defendant has or the
propriety of giving the defendant the information she wants, and thus may
not actually provide the defendant with new information.67
Additionally, although evidence suppression or motion in limine
litigation can be informative as to the substance of a case where, for
instance, the case turns on a key piece of evidence, oftentimes it will not
be because the aim of such litigation is to decide cabined questions of
the lawfulness of investigative behavior and admissibility, not the
merits.68 And other available pretrial motions simply involve issues that
are unlikely to regularly provide useful insights.69 Finally, regardless of
how informative pretrial motions practice could be, most pretrial
motions will only be filed if the circumstances call for them, and the
relevant circumstances will not arise in every case.70
Discovery, as with the other sources of information, is similarly not
an exceedingly helpful mechanism for learning about the government’s
claims. As many commentators and even courts have noted, discovery

67 See, e.g., United States v. Plotka, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1318–19 (N.D. Ala. 2020);
United States v. Johnson, Criminal No. 20-163, 2020 WL 7065833, at *1–5 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
3, 2020); United States v. Jain, 19-cr-59 (PKC), 2019 WL 6888635, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
18, 2019); United States v. Sullivan, CRIM. NO. 17-00104 JMS-KJM, 2019 WL 8301178,
at *1 (D. Haw. Dec. 2, 2019); United States v. Brooks, 17-CR-171W(Sr), 2018 WL
5722797, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2018); United States v. Cook, No. 3:16cr312, 2018 WL
1744682, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018); United States v. Farmer, Case No. 2:15-cr-72,
2017 WL 11470829, at *1–3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2017).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Houk, Case No. 1:18-po-00307-SAB, 2019 WL 4835333,
at *1–4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019); United States v. Renzi, No. CR 08-00212-TUC-DCB (BPV),
2010 WL 1962668, at *1–3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 1962644, at *1
(May 14, 2010); United States v. Fama, No. S1 95 Cr. 840 (RO), 1996 WL 438165, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1996).
69 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b).
70 Cf., e.g., United States v. Rivera, 68 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Counsel has a duty
not to make . . . frivolous contentions.”); Smith v. United States, Nos. 1:07-cr-146-CLCSKL-4, 1:11-cv-215-CLC-SKL, 2015 WL 164155, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2015) (“The
failure of defense counsel to pursue frivolous motions and objections cannot constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Hanes v. United States, Nos. 04-CR-0604 W, 09-CV1473 W, 2010 WL 625336, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2010) (“Even assuming that Petitioner
asked Mr. Johnson to file the motion to dismiss, it may have been unethical for him to do
so. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.1 (West, 2009) (‘A lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there
is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.’).”); United States v. Stepney,
No. CR 01-0344, 2002 WL 1460258, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2002) (“Well-established rules
of ethical conduct require all attorneys to exercise their informed professional judgment
to refrain from wasting the court’s time and prejudicing their clients’ interests. . . . The
motion filed in this action is one of those clever pieces of mental gymnastics engaged in
late in the evening, perhaps after a night cap. . . . The court will not reimburse attorneys
out of CJA funds for such useless time.”).
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in criminal cases is quite limited.71 For example, criminal “[d]efendants
are generally not entitled to depose witnesses before trial,” to “require
prosecutors to respond to interrogatories or document requests,” to
“require the [government] to turn over names and contact information
of potential witnesses,” or to access statements made by prospective
government witnesses.72 The discovery that a defendant does receive,
moreover, is largely restricted to: their own statements; their prior
record; documents and other items “material to preparing the defense,”
to be used in the government’s case at trial, or belonging to them; and a
summary of any expert witness testimony.73 In addition, criminal
discovery simply provides access to evidence, and since any collection
of evidence could likely be used to prove any number of theories of
liability, discovery only allows a defendant to guess at the substance of
the government’s allegations.
Accordingly, and given that
(notwithstanding the limited scope of criminal discovery) the materials
obtained in discovery can be quite voluminous and time consuming to
examine, defendants may be substantially hindered in using discovery
materials to learn about their case.74
Finally, although prosecutors and defendants frequently
communicate over the course of a case, such as through plea
negotiations,75 those communications too do not reliably and fully
71 See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 2018); Gold et al.,
supra note 10, at 1624–25, 1633, 1645; Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The
Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1103–08 (2014);
Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31–32.
72 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1625; Meyn, supra note 10, at 80; see FED. R. CRIM. P.
15(a)(1), 16(a); see also Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31–32.
73 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1). Relatedly, defendants have the constitutional right under
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny to the disclosure of material, exculpatory evidence.
But that right is essentially encompassed by the discovery provisions of the Criminal
Rules. See, e.g., United States v. Muniz-Jaquez, 718 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Rule 16 is . . . broader than Brady.”); United States v. Lujan, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1256
(D.N.M. 2008) (“Because Rule 16 requires disclosure of items material to preparing the
defense, the rule encompasses disclosure of Brady materials.”). And the sharing of Brady
evidence may not be required until the eve of trial, or even until trial itself. See, e.g.,
McNeill v. Bagley, 10 F.4th 588, 600 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d
255, 262 (3d Cir. 2013); Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1645–46; Ion Meyn, The Haves of
Procedure, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1765, 1798 n.174 (2019).
74 See, e.g., Drew Findling, Unable to Bear the Weight of the ‘Document Dump’: A Heavy
Burden on Individuals and an Increasing Threat to Due Process, CHAMPION, Sept./Oct.
2018, at 5; Morvillo et al., supra note 44, at 175; see also United States v. Plotka, 438 F.
Supp. 3d 1310, 1319 n.6 (N.D. Ala. 2020) (“Dr. Plotka responds that discovery is so
voluminous—including over 28,000 documents and over 90,000 text messages—that it
does ‘nothing to narrow the issues for trial in this case or to put the defense on notice of
the charge.’” (citation omitted)).
75 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1627; Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring
Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8–9, 19 (2017).
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inform defendants about the government’s allegations. To start, “the
prosecutor has an incentive to present information that causes a
defendant to overestimate the likelihood of conviction.”76 Thus, the
government is likely to share information in a manner that does not
paint a wholly accurate picture of its case and provable allegations. The
uncertainty is further amplified by the fact that the prosecution can
“indict[] a defendant on higher or different charges prior to trial after
plea negotiations fail.”77 And of course, any disclosures that occur
through informal communications are necessarily discretionary and
hence cannot be counted upon in any given case.78
In short, criminal defendants are strikingly limited in their ability
to understand the government’s claims against them prior to trial.79
Indeed, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules itself has
acknowledged this, with a judicial member observing “that with
indictments stated in broad general terms and very limited pretrial
discovery [there are] occasional cases in which defense counsel at the
pretrial conference says that he or she still does not know what the
defendant is being accused of.”80 Aligning the criminal pleading
standard with the civil standard, however, would do much to correct
that problem.81 Doing so would require that criminal pleadings contain
at least “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”82 That, in turn, would mean that defendants
would receive a fact-bound description of what they are accused of
detailed enough to provide them with “fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.”83 Additionally, it would mean
Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1625–27; accord McConkie, supra note 75, at 19.
United States v. Solis, CR 13-3895 MCA, 2015 WL 13651227, at *4–6 (D.N.M. Mar.
26, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 13651231, at *3 (Dec. 23, 2015); see also Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358, 365 (1978) (concluding that there is no due process violation
“when a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea negotiations to reindict
the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the offense with which
he was originally charged”).
78 See McConkie, supra note 75, at 4.
79 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1624–27.
80 Minutes, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, U.S. CTS. 20 (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-04-18-minutes_-_criminal_rules_
meeting_final_0.pdf.
81 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1641–42; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at
31–32; cf. Kallen, supra note 42, at 285 (“Requiring complaints to contain more facts also
provides better notice to the defendants as to which claim they may have to defend
against.”).
82 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted); see supra Part II.
83 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted); see also
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 2012) (“To survive a
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must ‘plead factual matter that, if taken as true, states a
76
77
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that defendants would receive that description in a clear and
straightforward format: a single, centralized, synthesized, written
document.84 And they would receive it in every case, since an
indictment (or information) must be produced and given to the
defendant in all felony prosecutions.85 Moreover, under a raised
pleading standard, other sources of information would become more
illuminating. For instance, pretrial motion to dismiss litigation would
become more informative because the government and the court would
be more likely to engage meaningfully with the merits of the case.86
Likewise, the informational value of discovery would increase because
defendants could better organize and understand the evidence they
receive.87
B. Alignment Would Reduce Informational Asymmetry
The second reason why aligning the civil and criminal pleading
standards would be valuable is that it would reduce the government’s
extraordinary informational advantage over defendants.
As just explained, criminal defendants have restricted means of
learning about the case against them.88 Accordingly, it may be difficult
for them to know precisely what points to disprove, what law to
research, what evidence to seek out, what witnesses to interview, and
what portions of discovery are important and warrant further
investigation.89 And even if a defendant can ferret out the substance of
the government’s claims and determine how to proceed, she will likely
claim’ that is plausible on its face. This necessarily requires that a plaintiff include
factual allegations for each essential element of his or her claim.” (citation omitted)).
The description would also accurately reflect the government’s case, given that, as
discussed more below, indictments are supposed to encompass only charges presented
to a grand jury and the government’s case at trial cannot deviate substantially from the
indictment. See infra notes 92, 180 and accompanying text; infra Section III.E.
84 Cf. Burnham, supra note 10, at 350 (“Complex trial records do not, of course,
present legal issues with the same clarity and concision as criminal charging documents
(or civil complaints).”).
85 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)–(b), 10(a).
86 See Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1632–33, 1641–42, 1649–50; cf. E. Farish Percy,
The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in the Wrong Direction,
62 VILL. L. REV. 213, 232–33 (2017) (explaining that critics of Twombly and Iqbal have
argued that defendants “would likely benefit [from the new pleading standard] by
gleaning helpful information from the plaintiffs’ responses to the motions to dismiss”).
87 Cf. Morvillo et al., supra note 44, at 175 (“[E]ven if the information sought is
available to the defendant through Rule 16 discovery, often times it is buried deep in a
voluminous document production, and the defendant’s search for the information is
arduous and expensive.”).
88 See supra Section III.A.
89 Cf., e.g., Kallen, supra note 42, at 285 (“Without more details in the complaint, the
defendant has no way of knowing what is important in the suit and what is not.”).
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still be constrained from an informational perspective, given that: any
time and resources expended in learning about the government’s case
will necessarily limit the time and resources available to investigate and
craft a defense; criminal discovery is limited; defendants do not have
robust investigatory powers or easy access to investigators; and
defendants may well be detained before trial.90
The government, however, is in a substantially different position.
Even before criminal proceedings begin, it has access to a range of “preindictment tools like search warrants and grand jury subpoenas,” as
well as a full-time, professional investigatory corps backed by the force
of law.91 Because of that—and other reasons, such as that a defendant
can generally only be convicted based on claims that have been
presented to a grand jury92—the government necessarily goes into
criminal proceedings with significant knowledge of the case, its
allegations, and its proof.93 Indeed, the government is usually expected
and encouraged to be fairly close to trial-ready by the time it files
charges.94 And of course, the government is never detained.95
Consequently, the government is at a serious informational
advantage over criminal defendants. Moreover, and as a result, it can
use its pretrial period to perfect and hone its case against the accused,

90 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1621, 1625–28; Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson
& Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention,
69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 714 (2017); Meyn, supra note 71, at 1105–14; Meyn, supra note 10,
at 53–54, 80, 86–87; Morvillo et al., supra note 44, at 175; see supra notes 71–74 and
accompanying text.
91 Burnham, supra note 10, at 361; see, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1628; Meyn,
supra note 71, at 1096 & n.13, 1123–24, 1126; Meyn, supra note 10, at 49, 56, 86;
Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31.
92 See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109–10 (2007); Russell v.
United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962); United States v. Dove, 884 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.
2018); United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531–32 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 1999); Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 30.
93 See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1202 (D. Utah 2019);
Burnham, supra note 10, at 360–61; Meyn, supra note 73, at 1778, 1819.
94 See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791–96 (1977); United States v.
Brown, 959 F.2d 63, 65–66 (6th Cir. 1992); Burnham, supra note 10, at 360–61 & n.39;
Meyn, supra note 10, at 79; cf., e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 n.7 (1984)
(“We have of course rejected the arguments that prosecutors are constitutionally
obligated to file charges against a suspect as soon as they have probable cause but before
they believe that they can establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
prosecutors must file charges as soon as they marshal enough evidence to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt but before their investigations are complete.” (citation
omitted)).
95 Cf. Meyn, supra note 71, at 1126 (acknowledging “the deep asymmetry between
an empowered State and a frequently detained defendant” presently reflected “in the
rules of criminal procedure”).
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whereas “[a] criminal defendant . . . will always have to play ‘catch-up’
to the prosecutor’s pre-complaint head start.”96
Aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards, however, would
begin to resolve that asymmetry and its consequences. As explained
above, it would provide defendants with substantially better
information about the case against them. And because criminal
pleadings are necessarily filed early in the proceedings, raising the
pleading standard would give defendants access to that information at
the outset of the case. Hence, they would be much more informed and
would not have to play as much “catch-up.”
C. Alignment Would Allow Challenges to the Case on the Merits
The third reason why aligning the criminal and civil pleading
standards would be valuable is that it would give defendants an
opportunity to challenge the merits of the case against them, which the
federal system presently limits markedly.97
Before trial, there is essentially no robust mechanism for
challenging the merits of the prosecution’s case.98 There are pretrial
proceedings that assess probable cause, such as the initial appearance
and preliminary hearing. But “[p]robable cause . . . is not a high bar,”99
and it may even permit mistakes of law and fact.100 Further, as noted
above, the charges can change after the initial appearance and
preliminary hearing, and a probable cause determination is not even
necessary if an indictment is returned first.101
The grand jury, likewise, does not serve as a meaningful check on
the prosecution or vehicle for challenging it. To start, the grand jury’s
standard for returning an indictment is probable cause, which, again, is

Meyn, supra note 10, at 85.
See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 349, 358; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610–
11, 1613, 1628, 1642; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 10, at 50–52.
98 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 349; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610–11,
1613, 1628, 1642; Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandelbaum, Are the Yates Memorandum
and the Federal Judiciary’s Concerns About Over-Criminalization Destined to Collide?, 53
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 933 (2016); Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 10, at 50–52.
99 Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014); Meyn, supra note 10, at 61–62;
see also, e.g., United States v. Baker, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1369, 1375–76 (N.D. Fla. 2021);
United States v. Rathbun, Criminal No. 20-mj-3061-KAR, 2020 WL 2104790, at *1 (D.
Mass. May 1, 2020); United States v. Bowie, No. 1:14–MJ–0189PAS, 2014 WL 4542974,
at *1 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2014); United States v. Perez, 17 F. Supp. 3d 586, 595–96 (S.D. Tex.
2014).
100 See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 62–63 (2014); United States v. Hanel,
993 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2017);
Olsen v. City of Henderson, 648 F. App’x 628, 631 (9th Cir. 2016).
101 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
96
97
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quite light.102 In addition, courts have said that grand juries need not be
instructed on the applicable substantive law at all or that it is sufficient
to merely read the relevant statute to the grand jury103—even though
grand jurors need not have any legal training104—and if instructions on
the substantive law are given, it is the prosecutor who gives them.105
Furthermore, neither the defense nor the judge is permitted to take part
in grand jury proceedings, meaning that the government need not face
counterarguments, objections, or judicial skepticism and scrutiny.106
What is more, raising challenges based on the grand jury proceedings is
nearly impossible. A grand jury finding that the evidence is sufficient to
show probable cause is unreviewable,107 and courts commonly hold that
challenges to grand jury instructions are improper, cannot prevail if the
indictment is facially valid, or must meet a high bar to succeed.108 And
even if the law permitted broader challenges, stringent grand jury
secrecy requirements make it exceedingly difficult for defendants to
even determine what happened in the grand jury room.109

See Kaley, 571 U.S. at 338; United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297–98
(1991); supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002); United States
v. Zangger, 848 F.2d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323,
1347 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Klein, 16-cr-442 (JMA), 2017 WL 1316999, at *14
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2017); United States v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 3d 255, 260 (W.D.N.Y.
2015); United States v. Mix, Criminal Action No. 12-171, 2013 WL 2458846, at *5 (E.D.
La. June 6, 2013); United States v. Pavlenko, No. 11-20279-CR, 2012 WL 1060157, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2012); United States v. Schmitz, CRIMINAL NO. 08-P-14-NE, 2008 WL
11340277, at *4 (N.D. Ala. May 20, 2008).
104 See LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 102 (“In general under the Jury Selection and Service
Act, any U.S. citizen age 18 or older who has resided in the judicial district for one year
is eligible to serve unless they are unable to speak, read, write, or understand English,
are infirm, or have been convicted of or currently face a felony charge.”).
105 See, e.g., Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d at 9; Smith, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 260–61; Burnham,
supra note 10, at 349.
106 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d); Burnham, supra note 10, at 349; see also Kaley, 571 U.S. at
338–39; Meyn, supra note 73, at 1819.
107 See, e.g., Kaley, 571 U.S. at 328; United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 53–55
(1992); Leonetti, supra note 60, at 679.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Acherman, CRIMINAL NO. 15-10046-LTS, 2015 WL 6126811, at *2 (D. Mass.
Oct. 16, 2015); Mix, 2013 WL 2458846, at *5–8; United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d
556, 567–68 (D. Md. 2011); United States v. Nacchio, Criminal Case No. 05-cr-00545EWN, 2006 WL 8439745, at *4–7 (D. Colo. Aug. 25, 2006).
109 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); Smith, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 260–64; LEIPOLD, supra note
12, §§ 106, 108, 113; Meyn, supra note 73, at 1819 n.312; see also United States v.
Thomas, Criminal Action No. 17-194 (RDM), 2019 WL 4095569, at *7 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug.
29, 2019) (concluding that the standard for disclosure “is that of particularized need,”
and observing that “[c]riminal defendants . . . have only rare[ly] satisfied this test”
(second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102
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Of course, Criminal Rule 12 provides a mechanism for dismissing
the indictment based on a merits challenge, but that mechanism is
largely toothless. Because a conclusory indictment that contains few
details is legally sufficient, a motion to dismiss will rarely capture any
defects in the prosecution’s case or theory of wrongdoing.110 To put it
more concretely, if an indictment alleging—in broad, statutory
language—that the defendant “knowingly did forcibly assault, resist,
oppose, impede, intimidate, and interfere with [a specific] Ranger with
the National Park Service, while she was engaged in her official duties”
is sufficient, a motion to dismiss will never reach the question of
whether the government could establish a violation of the statute by
proving that the defendant kicked a ranger in the chest while being
placed in a patrol car.111 And the availability of bills of particulars does
not solve that issue. Although the law is unsettled, several courts have
concluded that a bill of particulars cannot be used to seek dismissal of
an otherwise valid indictment,112 and in any event, bills of particulars
are challenging to obtain.113
Now, on the civil side, summary judgment allows courts to enter
judgment as to all or some of a case if, looking beyond the pleadings to
the evidence, there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”114 But the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure establish no summary judgment
mechanism, and courts routinely hold that criminal defendants cannot
use a motion to dismiss in place of that mechanism to terminate charges
110 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 349, 358; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1628 &
n.98, 1640–43; Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 933; Meyn, supra note 10, at 55–
57; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 32.
111 See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., United States v. Critzer, 951
F.2d 306, 307–08 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (reversing a district court dismissal of
an indictment based on facts provided by the government where the indictment itself
was sufficient); United States v. Godwin-Painter, Case No. CR415-100, 2015 WL
13735432, at *1, *4–5 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2015) (refusing to address, at the motion to
dismiss stage, whether a more specific telling of the defendant’s alleged conduct
established a violation of the applicable statute because the broadly worded indictment
was sufficient), adopted, 2015 WL 5838501, at *2–3 (Oct. 6, 2015); United States v.
Autry, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:18-cr-349-MLB-CMS, 2019 WL 8757215, at *2–3 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 20, 2019) (similar), adopted, 2020 WL 1026707, at *1–3 (Mar. 3, 2020).
112 See, e.g., United States v. Brantley, 461 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam); United States v. Nagi, 254 F. Supp. 3d 548, 564 (W.D.N.Y. 2017); United States
v. Eichman, 756 F. Supp. 143, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Rubbish Removal,
Inc., 602 F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D.N.Y 1984); see also United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661,
665–66 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497, 1499
(C.D. Cal. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 828 F.3d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Mirabile, 369 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
113 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
114 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) & advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment.
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on the ground of insufficient evidence—i.e., based on any legal or factual
assessment of the government’s case that looks to its actual proof.115
There is an exception to that rule, as courts may permit summary
dismissals where the government agrees to proffer all of its evidence,
the facts are undisputed, or the parties have stipulated to the relevant
facts.116 That exception, however, is narrow.117
To be sure, trial and post-trial procedure offers defendants
numerous opportunities to challenge the merits. There is the trial
decision itself, litigation over jury instructions, motions for a judgment
of acquittal or new trial, and appeal.118 Yet there are serious risks and
costs to going to trial, including enhanced penalties;119 prosecutors have
a tremendous informational and power advantage that generates
additional pressure to forego trial;120 and nearly all federal criminal
defendants plead guilty.121 Defendants who plead guilty, moreover, are
typically prohibited from appealing their convictions because a guilty
plea operates as “a waiver of all nonjurisdictional” challenges,122 and in
addition, plea agreements commonly demand the waiver of appellate

See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2018); Burnham,
supra note 10, at 349; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610; Leonetti, supra note 60, at 668–
69; Meyn, supra note 10, at 61; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 10, at 52; James
Fallows Tierney, Comment, Summary Dismissals, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1841, 1841–42, 1850,
1853 (2010).
116 See, e.g., Sampson, 898 F.3d at 282; United States v. Todd, 446 F.3d 1062, 1068
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Tierney,
supra note 115, at 1841–42.
117 See, e.g., Sampson, 898 F.3d at 282; United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 598 n.9
(3d Cir. 2012); Todd, 446 F.3d at 1068. In fact, not every court recognizes such an
exception. See Huet, 665 F.3d at 598 n.9; Yakou, 428 F.3d at 247; United States v. Salman,
378 F.3d 1266, 1267–69, 1268 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
118 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29–30, 33; Burnham, supra note 10, at 349; Gold et al.,
supra note 10, at 1628; Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 933.
119 See infra Section III.F.
120 See supra Section III.B; infra Section III.F.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 2018); U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 56
(2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf; Gold
et al., supra note 10, at 1608; Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, Sentencing Reform: Fixing
Root Problems, 87 UMKC L. REV. 97, 97 (2018).
122 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
115
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rights.123 That all means that most defendants are effectively barred
from challenging the merits entirely.124
Aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards, however, would
mitigate that problem substantially. As explained previously, doing so
would require indictments to be at least factually detailed enough to
meet the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard. And if indictments were
sufficiently detailed to meet that standard, that would allow courts, on a
motion to dismiss, to consider whether the facts as the government
believes them to be amount to a federal crime. Thus, defendants could
mount a robust challenge to the merits of the prosecution’s case—
before and without having to go to trial.125
What is more, bolstering the criminal pleading standard could
allow motions to dismiss to perform an analogous role to summary
judgment on the civil side, even without the formal creation of such a
mechanism for criminal proceedings. As noted above, the government
has access to significant pre-indictment investigative resources, should
usually be nearly ready for trial by the time it files charges, and can
generally only charge a defendant based on allegations actually
presented to a grand jury; and as explained in more detail below, the
government’s proof at trial cannot meaningfully differ from the
allegations in the indictment.126 In other words, indictments can and
must be based on actual evidence, meaning that, under a heightened
pleading standard, the government’s allegations would necessarily
reflect the facts in evidence. Consequently, a motion to dismiss, despite
nominally only analyzing the government’s pleading, could effectively
come quite close to assessing its proof, similar to summary judgment.
Finally, by giving defendants the chance to contest their case before
trial, raising the criminal pleading standard would also generate greater
opportunities to challenge their case on appeal. Although guilty pleas
generally waive appellate rights, Criminal Rule 11(a)(2) authorizes
conditional pleas, through which defendants can reserve “the right to
have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified
pretrial motion.”127 Presently, there is little reason for defendants to use
123 See, e.g., Kevin Bennardo, Post-Sentencing Appellate Waivers, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 347, 348–49 (2015); Leanna C. Minix, Note, Examining Rule 11(b)(1)(n) Error:
Guilty Pleas, Appellate Waiver, and Dominguez Benitez, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 551, 553
& n.7 (2017).
124 Cf., e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 349–50; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1608–13,
1621–24, 1628, 1642; Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 933.
125 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 356–59; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1612–
13, 1641–42.
126 See supra Section III.B; infra Section III.E.
127 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
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that provision to raise appellate merits challenges. But with a more
robust dismissal mechanism, defendants who choose not to take their
case to trial would have much greater motivation to invoke Rule
11(a)(2) to preserve such challenges.128
D. Alignment Would Promote Greater Clarity in the Criminal Law
The fourth benefit of aligning the civil and criminal pleading
standards is that doing so would promote more clarity in the criminal
law.
As just explained, defendants’ first truly meaningful opportunity to
challenge the case against them is at trial, very few defendants
ultimately go to trial, and those defendants who do not go to trial are
generally unable to appeal.129 Moreover—and likely relatedly—there
are relatively few criminal appeals and nearly half of criminal appeals
do not challenge the conviction; according to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, in 2019, approximately 6,793 cases were appealed out of
75,108 convictions, and 47.6 percent of those appeals contested the
sentence alone.130 And as discussed in greater detail below, there are
strict limits on re-prosecution or appeal by the government if the
defendant prevails—even erroneously—at trial.131 Accordingly, the
federal courts, at both the trial and appellate levels, are quite limited in
their ability to opine on, give tangible meaning to, and offer clarifying
guidance about the substantive criminal law.132
128 Rule 11(a)(2) requires that the government and court consent to a conditional
plea. See id. But a defendant with an arguably strong case might push forcefully for a
conditional plea as part of plea negotiations, and the government and court might well
accede to such a plea if the defendant agreed not to go to trial to preserve their challenge.
Cf. id. R. 11(a) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (explaining that Rule
11(a)(2) was added because “a defendant who has lost one or more pretrial motions will
often go through an entire trial simply to preserve the pretrial issues for later appellate
review,” thereby “wast[ing] . . . prosecutorial and judicial resources, and caus[ing] delay
in the trial of other cases”). Courts, moreover, may be inclined to approve conditional
pleas involving motions to dismiss based on the pleading standard because appellate
review would not require a trial record. Cf. id. (“The requirement of approval by the
court is most appropriate, as it ensures, for example, that the defendant is not allowed
to take an appeal on a matter which can only be fully developed by proceeding to trial.”);
Burnham, supra note 10, at 351 (explaining that motions to dismiss are based on “a
discrete set of assumed or undisputed facts” and do not require appellate courts to
“review[] a lengthy trial record”).
129 See supra Section III.C.
130 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 121, at 42, 176–77.
131 See infra notes 276–278 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 347–51; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1613,
1642–43; cf. Alexis v. Barr, 960 F.3d 722, 728–29 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] majority of
criminal cases are resolved without a written judicial decision or by plea bargain. See
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (noting that
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Raising the criminal pleading standard would do much to correct
that problem and produce greater clarity in the law. As noted above, it
would enable criminal defendants to mount challenges before both
district and appellate courts that they otherwise would never raise.133
Furthermore, a heightened pleading standard would likely cause the
government to lose cases at the motion to dismiss stage that it otherwise
would have lost at trial; that, in turn, would expand the government’s
ability to appeal and/or proceed with the litigation because the
government can appeal a pretrial decision that the charging document
is defective, and such a decision does not bar re-prosecution.134 Thus, a
heightened pleading standard would create more opportunities for
litigation, thereby giving district and appellate courts a greater ability to
clarify the law by issuing more decisions resolving its difficult
questions.135
E. Alignment Would Prevent Overly Aggressive, Wrong, or
Capricious Prosecutorial Positions
A fifth reason why aligning the civil and criminal pleading
standards would be a favorable policy decision is that it would limit
prosecutors in their ability to advance overly aggressive or wrong
arguments or to shift their stances at will.
As noted above, the federal system offers few checks on the merits
of the prosecution’s case. There are minimal checks prior to trial, and
‘97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions are the result of
guilty pleas’). Guilty pleas do not result in a reported decision from state court, which
means that citable state decisions are only available in a very small percentage of
prosecutions that result in both a trial and appeal.”); Kallen, supra note 42, at 285 (“In a
world where most cases end in settlement, there is little opportunity for appellate
judges to review cases.”).
133 See supra Section III.C.
134 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3731; Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 834 (2014) (per
curiam); United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 283 n.11 (2d Cir. 2018); United States
v. Bobo, 419 F.3d 1264, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Slough, 679 F. Supp.
2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2010); Tierney, supra note 115, at 1842, 1850–52, 1862–63.
135 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1613, 1642–43; cf. Kallen, supra note 42, at
285 (“A pleading standard that imposes stricter requirements of complaints will most
likely result in a greater number of successful motions to dismiss. This approach, in
turn, will give appellate judges the opportunity to review dismissed cases that, under
the previous system, would likely have resulted in settlement and never afforded
judicial review on appeal.”). Raising the pleading standard would also benefit legal
clarity because motions to dismiss challenging the sufficiency of an indictment generally
raise only pure questions of law that present issues clearly and are subject to largely
plenary review—in contrast to questions that involve complex factual or evidentiary
issues or that may receive greater deference. See, e.g., United States v. Masha, 990 F.3d
436, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2021); Burnham, supra note 10, at 350–53, 359; Gold et al., supra
note 10, at 1643.
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the trial and post-trial checks are only available in the very rare cases in
which defendants refuse to yield to the pressures to plead guilty.136 And
there are limited avenues for courts to clearly define the substantive
criminal law.137 Consequently, the government may be permitted to
take overbroad or erroneous legal positions with little judicial or
defense scrutiny.138
Relatedly, federal criminal procedure offers little protection
against the prosecution “continually revis[ing]” its claims and thereby
surprising or confusing defendants.139 In theory, that should not be the
case. The indictment requirement is supposed to ensure that the
defendant is prosecuted on the basis of the allegations and charges
actually presented to the grand jury and to prevent the prosecution
from being “free to roam at large—to shift its theory of criminality so as
to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial and appeal.”140
Indeed, courts hold that “[o]nce a grand jury indicts a defendant, the
‘charges may not be broadened through amendment except by the
grand jury itself’”—or else an improper “constructive amendment”
occurs; and “the evidence offered at trial [cannot] prove[] facts
materially different from those alleged in the indictment”—or else an
impermissible “variance” occurs.141
In practice, however, the government is not cabined by what it
presents to the grand jury or by the indictment itself, and that is largely
because conclusory indictments are permissible.142 First of all, many
courts reason that they should look to the indictment rather than grand

See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.D.
138 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 356–59; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1643;
Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 933; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 32;
Tierney, supra note 115, at 1863.
139 Burnham, supra note 10, at 361.
140 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 767–70 (1962).
141 United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see
also United States v. Farish, 535 F.3d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The basic difference
between a constructive amendment and a variance is this: a constructive amendment
changes the charge, while the evidence remains the same; a variance changes the
evidence, while the charge remains the same.” (citation omitted)).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1202 (D. Utah 2019);
Burnham, supra note 10, at 361; see also Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 30 (“Since
one can discern what facts the grand jury must have considered and found only from the
factual findings pleaded in the indictment, an indictment that pleads ‘conclusions of law,’
rather than specific factual allegations underlying these legal conclusions, should be
subject to dismissal under the Russell and Iqbal-Twombly line of authority because such
an indictment would not ‘assure that any conviction [by verdict of the petit jury] would
arise out of the theory of guilt presented to the grand jury.’” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)).
136
137
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jury transcripts—even assuming those could be obtained143—to
determine whether there has been a constructive amendment or
variance.144 Additionally, numerous courts have stated that “[w]here a
generally framed indictment encompasses the specific legal theory or
evidence used at trial, there is no constructive amendment”;145 in other
words, it is difficult to implicitly broaden an already broadly worded
indictment. Furthermore, if an indictment is conclusory, it will not
allege any facts that might differ from the trial evidence, even if the trial
evidence differs from the evidence presented to the grand jury,146 and
the Supreme Court has held that a “variance between the broad
allegations in the indictment and the narrower proof at trial [does not
violate a defendant’s] right to have had a grand jury screen any alleged
offenses upon which he might be convicted at trial.”147 What is more,
courts and the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules have gone so far
as to say that the government could make an indictment more conclusory
to avoid constructive amendment or variance challenges.148 And on a
variance claim, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice to prevail,

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 701 F.3d 274, 308 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Daly, 125 F.3d 845, at *1 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); United States v.
Hilliard, 17 CR 35 (VB), 2018 WL 8996338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2018), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Drayton, 796 F. App’x 24, 26–27 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v.
Mangano, 16-CR-540 (JMA), 2018 WL 851860, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2018); United
States v. Wynn, Cr. No. 8:10-cr-1026-GRA, 2011 WL 2682124, at *3 (D.S.C. July 11, 2011);
United States v. Harris, Criminal No. 05-0023-WS, 2008 WL 2519868, at *2 (S.D. Ala.
June 20, 2008). But see United States v. Teman, 465 F. Supp. 3d 277, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(“The extent to which a court . . . may look beyond the language of the indictment to
consider the content of the grand jury proceedings [in considering a constructive
amendment claim] is unclear.” (citation omitted)).
145 Banki, 685 F.3d at 118 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 923–24 (4th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1990); Teman,
465 F. Supp. 3d at 295; United States v. Narang, 1:16-cr-43 (LMB), 2019 WL 3949308, at
*14 n.25 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2019); United States v. Apodaca, 287 F. Supp. 3d 21, 48 (D.D.C.
2017); United States v. Luong, No. CR. 99-433WBS GGH, 2009 WL 1393406, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. May 15, 2009), aff’d in relevant part, 610 F. App’x 598, 600 (9th Cir. 2015).
146 See Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d at 1202.
147 United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 137–38, 145 (1985); accord United States v.
Weinstock, 153 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1998).
148 See Weissman, 899 F.2d at 1115 (“The government in styling the indictment could
have used the general language of the statute to refer to the enterprise in which
appellants allegedly were involved. Indeed, following this opinion, the government may
well summon another grand jury and reindict appellants for conspiring to violate RICO
in collusion with a more generally described enterprise.”); U.S. CTS., supra note 80, at 20–
21 (“Prosecutors have an incentive to [employ conclusory indictments] in order to avoid
post trial claims of some variance between the allegations in the indictment and the
proof.”).
143
144
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which will likely not be shown so long as they received notice of the
variance before trial.149
Aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards would plainly
address those issues. First of all, it would prevent the government from
adopting aggressive or faulty legal theories by expanding opportunities
for challenging the government’s case and generating greater clarity
about what the law means.150 Additionally, by requiring that the
indictment contain factual allegations, alignment would ensure that
indictments could no longer be framed generally so as to obscure
prosecutors shifting away from what they presented to the grand
jury.151 In other words, the government’s position would be nailed
down at the indictment stage, and if prosecutors tried to vary from it,
they would open the door to successful constructive amendment or
variance challenges.152
F. Alignment Would Protect Against False Guilty Pleas
The sixth reason why aligning the civil and criminal pleading
standards would be beneficial is that it would reduce the likelihood that
defendants would plead guilty in cases where they are not actually so.
As a matter of fairness and accuracy, a defendant should only plead
guilty if she has actually committed the crime for which she is charged.
That ideal, however, is tempered significantly by the reality of
incentives. It is well-established that defendants typically receive
enhanced punishment if they go to trial,153 and studies have shown that
See, e.g., Banki, 685 F.3d at 119.
See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 358–59; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1643;
Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 933; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 32; supra
Sections III.C–III.D.
151 See Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d at 1202; Burnham, supra note 10, at 361; cf. Kyle R.
Williams, Note, Plausible Pleading in Patent Suits: Predicting the Effects of the Abrogation
of Form 18, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 339 (2016) (“[T]ougher pleading
requirements will force plaintiffs to crystalize their theory of infringement early on in
the litigation, reducing expenses for both plaintiffs and defendants.”).
152 To be sure, the government would not be completely pigeonholed by the
indictment. Again, a successful variance challenge requires the defendant to show
prejudice, and courts have often indicated that the rules binding prosecutors to the
terms of the indictment are flexible. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 833 F.3d 56, 70–71
(2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Dubon-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 2002). But
prosecutors would be substantially more limited under a heightened pleading regime.
153 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 5 (2018), https://
www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trialpenalty-the-sixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-tosave-it.pdf; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1609, 1620, 1628; Joy & Uphoff, supra note 121,
at 101; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31; Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 85–86 (2005).
149
150
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defendants—regardless of guilt—may be willing to plead guilty to avoid
such a consequence.154
Even still, a defendant should only “plead guilty if the [plea] deal
requires her to serve no more than her expected punishment—that is,
the punishment she would receive at trial, discounted by the chance of
acquittal.”155 And one would think that the chance of an innocent
defendant being acquitted would be high. As we have seen, however, “a
defendant has limited ability to learn the contours of the prosecutor’s
case,” and that is especially so prior to deciding on a plea offer.156
Compounding that, as discussed above, the criminal law may be unclear
and prosecutors may be able to shift their theories as proceedings
unfold.157 Thus, defendants are left unable to fully evaluate their
“chance of acquittal”—which may even be artificially deflated by the
foregoing circumstances—when deciding whether to plead guilty.158
Moreover, prosecutors have broad authority to influence the ultimate
punishment a defendant will receive by way of plea versus by way of
trial.159 Consequently, because one half of the plea bargaining analysis
is in the hands of prosecutors—who often successfully impose more
stringent penalties for going to trial—and the other half cannot be
rationally evaluated and may even be actively depressed, “[r]isk averse
defendants”—even innocent ones—“who wish to minimize harsh
penalties or collateral consequences may be eager to plead guilty to a
lesser offense or for a reduced sentence.”160
That penalty-incentive problem, furthermore, is actually worse for
innocent defendants than for guilty ones. Guilty defendants may not
know the strength of the government’s case or precisely what the
government is alleging, but at least they “often know what crime they
have committed, and they accordingly may be able to guess what
evidence the prosecutor has to prove their guilt.”161 “But innocent
defendants have not committed a crime, and they likely have no
154 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., supra note 153, at 6; John H. Blume &
Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 170 (2014); Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent
Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence
Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 48 (2013); Wright, supra note 153, at 85–86.
155 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1624.
156 Id. at 1624–28; see also supra Section III.A.
157 See supra Sections III.D–III.E.
158 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1624–28; accord Tierney, supra note 115, at 1864; see
also supra Sections III.A–III.B, III.E.
159 See, e.g., Blume & Helm, supra note 154, at 170; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1609,
1616–24; Joy & Uphoff, supra note 121, at 101–05.
160 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1616–28.
161 Id. at 1627.
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independent knowledge about the evidence the prosecutor has against
them or the prosecutor’s theory.”162 Hence, they are less able than guilty
defendants to determine whether it is worth it to risk going to trial, and
more likely to have an artificially dampened probability of acquittal.163
What is more, innocent defendants “are on average more risk averse
than guilty defendants,”164 meaning that they may be even more likely
to plead guilty in the face of heavy pressure to do so.
In addition, going to trial could lead to other substantial costs. As
one article has explained:
Prosecutors may also use the threat of other, non-criminal
consequences to obtain a plea. For example, a prosecutor may
offer a plea bargain that avoids immigration consequences for
non-citizens. Or a prosecutor may threaten to pursue
forfeiture or asset seizure if a defendant refuses to plead. A
prosecutor might also threaten to bring charges against a
friend or family member to induce a plea. Moreover,
prosecutors may further disadvantage defendants by
successfully requesting that they be denied bail, thus leaving
the defendants with little ability to prepare their cases, more
likely to be convicted, and less willing to demand trials than
those who are free before trial.165
Beyond that, even apart from prosecutorial pressure, criminal trials can
“impose[] significant legal expenses, incalculable emotional hardship,
and severe reputational injury.”166 And those costs can extend beyond
the trial, regardless of outcome. The defendant generally must pay his
own legal expenses, even if he wins;167 hearing government witnesses—
who may be friends, family, or colleagues—testify and (potentially)
experiencing cross-examination may be psychologically damaging
regardless of the result; and defendants who prevail at trial may suffer
reputation-eviscerating allegations that “they did it but there wasn’t
quite enough evidence to convince the jury beyond a reasonable

Id.
See id.
164 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2495 (2004).
165 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1620–21 (footnotes omitted).
166 Burnham, supra note 10, at 354; accord, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 51, at 728; Laurie
L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v.
Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 457, 464 (2013); Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 932–
33.
167 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 255 F.3d 833, 835–36 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
162
163
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doubt.”168 Those costs are yet another thumb on the scale in favor of
pleading guilty.
All of that is amplified by the fact that, as explained above,
defendants have little opportunity to challenge the merits of the case
against them before trial.169 Accordingly, many defendants who might
have a valid challenge to raise will never do so out of fear of what might
happen at trial.170 In other words, there is little to prevent prosecutors
from bringing charges on questionable grounds, and innocent
defendants may well decide to plead guilty to those charges without
protest.171
Aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards would go a long
way to fixing this issue and reducing the chance that an innocent
defendant would plead guilty. Again, it would provide defendants—
especially innocent ones—with substantially more information about
the case against them, and it would do so early on.172 Hence, defendants
would have greater capacity to determine their chance of acquittal and
make informed decisions about whether to go to trial.173 Additionally,
by clarifying the law and giving defendants a greater ability to prepare
for and avoid surprise at trial, a heightened pleading standard would
raise the chance of acquittal—again, especially for innocent
defendants.174 Furthermore, it would ensure that defendants would not
have to accept the costs and risks of going to trial to contest their
charges.175 And that, in turn, would mean that “[p]rosecutors would be
less likely to file charges in cases in which the prosecutor has a shaky
legal theory or tells a vague or implausible story about the defendant’s
actions.”176

168 Cf. Cynthia L. Randall, Comment, Acquittals in Jeopardy: Criminal Collateral
Estoppel and the Use of Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 315–16 (1992)
(“Common sense suggests that many acquittals would not stand if they had to be
justified under a preponderance of the evidence standard.”).
169 See supra Section III.C.
170 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610; Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at
932–33; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31; Wright, supra note 153, at 85–86.
171 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 358; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1642; Kelly
& Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 932–33.
172 See supra Section III.A.
173 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1640–41.
174 See supra Sections III.A–III.B, III.E.
175 See supra Section III.C.
176 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1643.
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G. Alignment Would Clarify the Scope of Criminal Cases
Aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards would also be
valuable because it would clarify the scope of the charges and the case,
which is often uncertain under existing law, and thereby ensure that
defendants receive meaningful double jeopardy protections.
“The Double Jeopardy Clause ‘protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal’” or conviction, as well
as “against multiple punishments for the same offense.”177 In assessing
whether the Clause has been violated, the primary sources courts
consider are the indictment and the record of the relevant
proceeding.178
Between those two sources, the indictment should be the most
helpful. Indeed, one of the key purposes of an indictment is to protect
against double jeopardy.179 More practically, however, an indictment is
a single document that lays out the substance of the case and the
government’s allegations, organized by charge. And its contents must
accurately reflect the case and offenses at issue because, if they did not,
that would constitute a constructive amendment or variance.180
But, as we have seen, indictments can be incredibly vague and
provide little detail about the charges and the acts encompassed by
them.181 Thus, the parties can be required to rely on the record, which
contains a (potentially voluminous and poorly organized) hodgepodge
of documents, transcripts, and other materials.182 Furthermore,
because records consists of a range of materials covering a variety of
issues that have not been distilled into a single narrative description,
they are necessarily more ambiguous than indictments and hence more
amenable to interpretation.183 Moreover, that ambiguity is amplified by
the fact that our minimal indictment system restricts what counts as a
constructive amendment or variance and thereby broadens the
materials that might appear in a record.184 And minimalistic
indictments cannot effectively be used to shed light on the record
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804 (2018); United States v.
Votrobek, 847 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d
1251, 1261 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 282 (2d Cir. 2006).
179 See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1962); United States v.
Thomas, 367 F.3d 194, 197 n.1 (4th Cir. 2004).
180 See supra Section III.E.
181 See supra Part II.
182 Cf. Burnham, supra note 10, at 351 (explaining the difficulty of deciding appeals
on complex records).
183 Cf. id. (same).
184 See supra Section III.E.
177
178
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documents and their proper interpretation. All of that makes the
protections bestowed upon defendants by the Double Jeopardy Clause
uncertain, and it makes invoking those protections a burdensome and
time-consuming exercise.
Aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards would rectify
that issue, however. First of all, it would make the indictment useful for
resolving double jeopardy questions by ensuring that the document
actually describes the particular facts of each crime charged. That, in
turn, would mean that parties would rarely need to wade into the
record. And in cases where examining the record became necessary, the
record materials would likely be more limited because aligning the
pleading standards would give teeth to constructive amendment and
variance restrictions. Additionally, a more detailed indictment would
offer greater insights into the proper meaning of the record and thereby
help to clear up record ambiguity. In short, aligning the pleading
standards would ensure that the scope of each case is clear and that
defendants could meaningfully depend upon their double jeopardy
rights.
H. Alignment Would Help to Correct the Imbalance Between the
Protections Civil & Criminal Defendants Receive
Finally, aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards would
help to correct a seriously unfair and problematic imbalance between
the protections defendants receive in civil and criminal cases.
It is widely accepted, as a general proposition, that criminal
defendants should receive greater protections than civil ones.185 That is
so largely because, unlike civil cases, criminal cases always place the
defendant’s life or liberty at risk—meaning that the stakes are
necessarily higher in criminal litigation.186 But, under prevailing law,

See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–17 (2003);
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Fazaga v. FBI, 965 F.3d 1015, 1053
n.31 (9th Cir. 2020); In re Crim. Investigation of Doe, Criminal No. 08-10215-RGS, 2008
WL 3274429, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2008); Patterson v. Warner, 371 F. Supp. 1362, 1365
(S.D. W. Va. 1972); Burnham, supra note 10, at 357–58; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., “How Do
You Plead, Guilty or Not Guilty?”: Does the Plea Inquiry Violate the Defendant’s Right to
Silence?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1409, 1453 (2005); Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610–11,
1644; David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?, 53 GA. L. REV. 495,
511–12 (2019); Meyn, supra note 71, at 1132–33; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra
note 10, at 51; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31.
186 See, e.g., Patterson, 371 F. Supp. at 1365; Burnham, supra note 10, at 357–58;
Cochran, supra note 185, at 1453; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610–11, 1644; Meyn,
supra note 71, at 1132–33; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 10, at 51;
Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31.
185
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civil defendants are much more protected on the points laid out above,
given the higher civil pleading standard and other reasons.187
First, unlike criminal defendants, civil defendants possess robust
mechanisms for ascertaining information about the case against them
and are not at an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis their
adversary.188 For example, civil plaintiffs must include meaningful
factual allegations in their pleadings rather than mere conclusory
assertions. Thus, civil defendants automatically receive a clear
description of the case against them in a single streamlined document
right from the outset, litigation over the pleadings is informative about
the claims at issue, and the role of evidence in the case is intuitive.189 In
addition, civil discovery is powerful.190 In contrast to criminal
discovery, civil discovery requires parties to “disclose the names and
addresses of potential witnesses” and allows them to “broadly depose
witnesses, request documents, pose interrogatories, and conduct
physical examinations.”191 Furthermore, civil defendants, unlike their
criminal counterparts, can move for summary judgment, which
“requires the parties . . . to lay out an evidentiary record demonstrating
that a trial is necessary” and “also to marshal the evidence into legal
argument.”192 Finally, unlike the government in a prosecution,193 civil
plaintiffs are not expected to come into a case with near-exhaustive
knowledge of the relevant facts and do not have access to government
investigatory tools—which can dwarf those they do possess—meaning
that they do not automatically come into the case with an informational
head start.194
See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610–11.
See, e.g., id. at 1609–14; Meyn, supra note 71, at 1091–92; Meyn, supra note 10, at
46–47.
189 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1632–33; supra Part II.
190 See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 2018); Gold et al.,
supra note 10, at 1633–35; Meyn, supra note 71, at 1095–96, 1106–15; Meyn, supra note
73, at 1802–03; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31–32.
191 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1633–34 (footnotes omitted); accord, e.g., Weinberg,
Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31–32; see supra note 72 and accompanying text. The available
interrogatories include “contention interrogatories,” which “seek to clarify the basis for
or scope of an adversary’s legal claims.” Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 144 F.3d 418,
421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998).
192 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1635–36; see supra notes 66, 114–117 and
accompanying text.
193 See supra Section III.B.
194 See, e.g., Schwake v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2020); Ash v.
Anderson Merchrs., LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2015); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678
F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); Burnham, supra note 10, at 360–61; Gold et al., supra note
10, at 1644; Meyn, supra note 71, at 1095–96, 1123–26; Weinberg, Applying Twombly,
supra note 10, at 51; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31; see also Johns v. Eastman
187
188
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Civil defendants are in a more favorable informational position,
moreover, even though criminal defendants have at least as much, if not
a much greater, need for information and informational parity—even
beyond the higher stakes involved in criminal cases. First of all, unlike
civil defendants,195 criminal defendants are always presumed innocent,
meaning that they “should be presumed ignorant of the facts on which
the charges are based.”196 In addition, civil defendants are not likely to
be restricted in developing their case by pretrial detention.197 Further,
despite the powerful non-pleading-stage mechanisms civil defendants
possess for learning about the case against them, the Supreme Court in
Twombly emphasized that a more stringent civil pleading standard was
necessary because, inter alia, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the
complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement
of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests,” and “conclusory allegations”
provide a defendant with “little idea where to begin.”198 That reasoning
would seem at least equally applicable to criminal cases, particularly
given that—unlike in civil cases—the Constitution commands that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”199 Lastly, the law is
more accepting of erroneous judgments against civil defendants than
against criminal ones.200 But the lack of information and informational
Chem. Co., 248 F. Supp. 3d 765, 771 (S.D. W. Va. 2017) (explaining that even under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which sets the pleading standard for issues like
fraud and is more stringent than Rule 8(a), “a plaintiff is not required to ‘know every
detail before he or she could plead’” (citation omitted)).
195 See, e.g., Claiborne v. Blauser, 934 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Ruedlinger, 976 F. Supp. 976, 1005 (D. Kan. 1997); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Presumption of Civil Innocence, 104 VA. L. REV. 589, 589, 611–12 (2018).
196 LEIPOLD, supra note 12, § 130; accord Fontana v. United States, 262 F. 283, 286 (8th
Cir. 1919) (“When one is indicted for a serious offense, the presumption is that he is
innocent thereof, and consequently that he is ignorant of the facts on which the pleader
founds his charges, and it is a fundamental rule that the sufficiency of an indictment
must be tested on the presumption that the defendant is innocent of it and has no
knowledge of the facts charged against him in the pleading.”).
197 See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 10, at 53–54, 62–63.
198 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3, 565 n.10 (2007).
199 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also United States v. Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1202
(D. Utah 2019); Burnham, supra note 10, at 361–62; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra
note 10, at 49.
200 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In a
civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no
more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor
than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. . . . In a criminal case,
on the other hand, we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as
equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.”).
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parity in criminal cases makes erroneous criminal convictions more
likely by hindering defendants in mounting a defense and by
encouraging innocent defendants to plead guilty.201
Second, unlike criminal defendants, civil defendants have several
opportunities to meaningfully contest the case against them before trial.
For instance, given the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard, motions to
dismiss allow civil defendants to mount vigorous legal challenges at the
very outset.202 Further, civil defendants can move for summary
judgment after a motion to dismiss has failed to terminate a legally or
factually insufficient case.203
Again, that is true even though—beyond the stakes involved—
criminal defendants have at least as much need to challenge the case
against them before trial as civil ones. In the civil setting, allegations of
fraud must meet an even more stringent pleading standard than that
imposed by Twombly and Iqbal “because of the potential stigmatic injury
that comes with alleging fraud and the concomitant desire to ensure that
such fraught allegations are not lightly leveled,”204 and to “compel[] the
plaintiff to provide enough detail to enable the defendant to riposte
swiftly and effectively if the claim is groundless.”205 Yet the stigmatic
cloud of a criminal accusation casts a considerably darker shadow than
a mere civil fraud claim.206 Furthermore, criminal defendants may be
detained before trial, unlike most civil defendants,207 so permitting early
challenges in criminal cases is critical to prevent unwarranted
confinement. Finally, the Supreme Court imposed the Twombly-Iqbal
civil pleading standard in part to avoid undue pressure on defendants
to settle weak cases due to the burdens of litigation and discovery.208
See supra Sections III.A–III.B, III.F.
See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 355–58; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1632–
33; Meyn, supra note 10, at 55–56; supra Part II, Section III.C. A civil defendant can also
move for judgment on the pleadings, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c), although that is largely
equivalent to the motion to dismiss, see, e.g., Ruppe v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 993 F.
Supp. 2d 807, 809 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
203 See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 2018); Burnham,
supra note 10, at 349; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1635–36; Weinberg, Applying
Twombly, supra note 10, at 52.
204 Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 948 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
205 United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 776
(7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
206 Of course, criminal proceedings can involve allegations of fraud too. See Meyn,
supra note 10, at 56. As it stands, however, even those allegations are subject only to
Rule 7(c)’s minimal requirements. See id.
207 See, e.g., id. at 53, 62–63.
208 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007); Weinberg,
Applying Twombly, supra note 10, at 51; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31.
201
202
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But as suggested above and explained more shortly, there is at least as
much pressure to “settle” weak criminal cases.209
Third, civil defendants are better protected against lack of legal
clarity and overly aggressive, wrong, or capricious positions than
criminal defendants. As explained above, given the minimal criminal
pleading standard, criminal defendants have little protection in that
regard.210 The higher pleading standard and multiple opportunities to
raise dispositive merits challenges in civil cases, however, necessarily
allow courts to issue clarifying opinions on the law,211 eliminate
unwarranted legal positions, and require plaintiffs to “commit to a
relatively specific set of factual allegations at the outset and then
attempt to prove it.”212 That is so, moreover, even though greater legal
clarity is generally required in the criminal context,213 and a lack of such
clarity, or unjustified or fickle prosecutorial positions, could easily lead
to unwarranted convictions—which, as just noted, are more
problematic than erroneous civil judgments.214
Fourth, civil defendants are much better protected from erroneous
settlements than criminal defendants. As explained above, civil
defendants have access to substantial case information, are not at an
informational disadvantage, and have multiple opportunities to
challenge the case against them—unlike criminal defendants.215 And
although the costs of civil litigation and trial can be significant and
therefore encourage settlement, the costs and risks of going to trial for
a criminal defendant are necessarily greater. Not only must they bear
See supra Section III.F; infra notes 215–216 and accompanying text.
See supra Sections III.D–III.E.
211 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 348–49; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1613,
1642–43; Kallen, supra note 42, at 285. There are also no restrictions on appeals by the
complaining party in civil cases. See Uzair Kayani, Law Done Backwards: The Tightening
of Civil and Loosening of Criminal Protections, 42 NOVA L. REV. 179, 200 (2018).
212 Burnham, supra note 10, at 355–59, 361; see, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at
1642–43; Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 933; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at
32; Williams, supra note 151, at 339.
213 Cf., e.g., Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“In the criminal
context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity in draftsmanship than in civil
contexts, commensurate with the bedrock principle that in a free country citizens who
are potentially subject to criminal sanctions should have clear notice of the behavior
that may cause sanctions to be visited upon them.” (citation omitted)); United States v.
Murray, 928 F.2d 1242, 1246 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We are mindful of the constraints placed
on the interpretation and application of criminal statutes, and we recognize that ‘[i]n the
criminal context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity in draftsmanship
than in civil contexts. . . .’ Furthermore, to avoid the imposition of penalties not intended
by Congress, the courts have applied the doctrine of lenity when there is serious doubt
as to the reach of a criminal statute.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
214 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 188–194, 202–203 and accompanying text.
209
210

HINTZ (DO NOT DELETE)

750

1/5/22 9:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:711

the standard financial and other burdens of litigation, but also: they are
risking enhancement of criminal penalties; they may be detained; and
prosecutors can amplify criminal sentences more readily than plaintiffs
can amplify civil judgments.216
Yet again, however, protections against erroneous settlements are
much more necessary in criminal litigation. Civil settlements are
different in kind than criminal settlements, even aside from the obvious
difference in magnitude between civil remedies and criminal
punishment. Civil settlements often do not involve admissions of, and
are generally not viewed as establishing, wrongdoing or liability.217 Yet
criminal settlements typically do involve the admission of guilt and
conclusively establish criminal liability.218 Hence, the very idea of an
“erroneous” civil settlement is questionable because settlements often
adjudicate nothing about the merits of a claim and can simply reflect an
economic calculation;219 but a guilty plea can certainly be factually
incorrect. Moreover, by requiring an admission of guilt and of
participation in behavior that society deems so reprehensible as to be
criminal, criminal settlements demand much more of defendants than
civil settlements.
Fifth, civil defendants can more easily clarify the scope of the
proceedings than criminal defendants. For example, under Civil Rule
15(b)(2), “A party may move—at any time, even after judgment—to
amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an
unpleaded issue.”220 But there is no similar Criminal Rule.221 And of
See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1609–10, 1616–24, 1629–30; Meyn, supra
note 10, at 53–54, 62–63; supra Section III.F.
217 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408(a) & advisory committee’s notes; Benjamin v. Brachman,
246 F. App’x 905, 926 (6th Cir. 2007); Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2000); Budget Cinema, Inc., v. Watertower Assocs., 81 F.3d 729, 731–32 (7th Cir.
1996); Carro v. Barra, Case No. 16-10479, 2018 WL 11357929, at *4, 8 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
3, 2018); Miller v. City of Harvey, No. 13 C 9257, 2015 WL 5144476, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
31, 2015); Morris v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-3959, 2013 WL 5781672, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–9, No. 12-CV-3161, 2012 WL
4321718, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2012); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig.,
80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings:
Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1257 (2016).
218 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 410 & advisory committee’s notes; Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518, 526 (4th Cir. 2020);
United States v. Zhou, 838 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2016); Uhlmann, supra note 217, at
1257.
219 See, e.g., Budget Cinema, 81 F.3d at 732 (“[A] settlement offer, rather than being
evidence of the objective reasonableness of a lawsuit, is as here frequently an economic
decision about the comparative costs of proceeding with litigation.”).
220 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(2).
221 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(e) (“Unless an additional or different offense is charged
or a substantial right of the defendant is prejudiced, the court may permit an
216
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course, the higher civil pleading standard itself ensures that civil
pleadings will often be more informative about the scope of the case
than criminal ones. Yet again, however, criminal defendants have a
much greater need for clarity. In civil cases, clarity regarding the scope
of the case is necessary primarily for preclusion purposes; in criminal
cases, clarity is necessary to vindicate the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
In short, civil defendants receive far greater protections than
criminal ones on a host of fronts. Moreover, they do so even though
criminal defendants have as much or an even greater need for those
protections, and notwithstanding the general view that criminal cases
require greater safeguards. That, in turn, raises serious fairness
questions. Indeed, as one court pointedly observed, “The ‘proverbial
visitor from Mars’ might well conclude from th[e] dichotomy [between
the civil and criminal pleading standards] that our justice system has a
greater concern with protecting the interests of civil defendants than
criminal defendants.”222 And other courts have raised similar points.223
Raising the criminal pleading standard to at least align with the
civil standard, however, would help to address these issues. Again, it
would provide criminal defendants with better information about the
case against them, lead to more informational parity between the
parties, provide defendants with an opportunity to challenge the
government’s position before trial, increase clarity in the criminal law,
impede overly aggressive, wrong, or capricious positions, reduce the
likelihood of erroneous guilty pleas, and clarify the scope of the
proceedings.224 Thus, although there may still be ways in which civil
defendants remain more protected, altering the pleading standard
would make a major impact.

information to be amended at any time before the verdict or finding.” (emphasis added));
cf. United States v. Sutton, 157 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1946) (“The appellant has been
convicted, but of what no one can say with certainty. . . . If it were permissible to amend
the pleadings in criminal prosecutions after verdict, as may be done in civil cases, we
might be able to patch up this information so as to state an offense; but there is no such
rule in criminal procedure, and none is likely to be so long as the Sixth Amendment
stands.” (footnote omitted)).
222 United States v. Novak, Case No. 13 CR 312, 2014 WL 2937062, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June
30, 2014) (citation omitted).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1201–03 (D. Utah 2019);
United States v. Bibbs, No. 15 CR 578, 2016 WL 4701441, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2016).
224 See supra Sections III.A–III.G.

HINTZ (DO NOT DELETE)

752

1/5/22 9:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:711

IV. WHY POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS ARE UNAVAILING
Of course, benefits are not the only factor to consider in assessing
the normative and policy value of a change to the criminal pleading
standard. Rather, the benefits must be weighed against any valid
concerns or drawbacks. But those are negligible in this case. Although
there are conceivable objections to aligning the civil and criminal
pleading standards—for instance, that alignment would: (A) make
criminal litigation more burdensome; (B) be improper because criminal
pleadings cannot be easily amended; (C) require prosecutors to reveal
sensitive information; (D) let guilty defendants go free; or (E) be
unnecessary to protect criminal defendants—none of those objections
ultimately holds water.
A. Alignment Would Increase the Burdens of Criminal Litigation
The first potential objection to raising the criminal pleading
standard to at least align with the civil pleading standard is that doing
so would make criminal litigation more burdensome. In fact, in its
rejection of the 2016 proposal to change the criminal pleading standard,
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules raised this very argument,
asserting that “the proposal would invite in criminal cases the kind of
costly, repetitive, and lengthy pretrial motions practice that now occurs
in some kinds of civil cases, including big financial cases, antitrust cases,
and securities class actions.”225 That objection, however, is overblown.
First of all, an increased pleading standard would not significantly
encumber the government. Although it would require prosecutors to
draft more detailed pleadings and respond to more motions to dismiss,
that should not be unduly challenging or time consuming.226 Those
obligations would simply require the government to state the
allegations on which the charges are based and argue for its theory of
illegality, which the government should have at the ready given that it is
expected and equipped to be largely prepared for trial at the time it files
charges.227 Also, prosecutors are salaried employees of the federal
government.228 Accordingly, asking that they expend some extra time
and effort would not tax the government in the same way as private
225 U.S. CTS., supra note 80, at 21; accord William Ortman, Second-Best Criminal Justice,
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1061, 1100–01 (2019).
226 See Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1658.
227 See Burnham, supra note 10, at 360–61; supra notes 91–94 and accompanying
text.
228 See Offs. of the U.S. Att’ys, Administratively Determined Pay Plan Charts, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao/career-center/salary-information/administratively-determined-pay-plan-charts (last updated Jan. 11, 2021).
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parties, who often must pay lawyers by the hour.229 Additionally,
although prosecutors are usually racing against the clock imposed by
the Speedy Trial Act—which demands that trial begin by the later of
“seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared
before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is
pending”230—the clock is paused for any “delay resulting from any
pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of
the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion,”231 or any
“delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days,
during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually
under advisement by the court.”232 Thus, responding to additional
pretrial motions to dismiss would not take up the government’s
valuable and limited Speedy Trial Act time, and indeed the government
could receive extra case-preparation time as a result.
Furthermore, a heightened pleading standard would not lead to
excessive or overly burdensome litigation in many cases. Much of the
time, the facts in criminal cases will be simple and easily expressed, and
the government’s theory of criminality will be banal.233 In such cases, so
long as the facts are stated, there would be little reason to raise a motion
to dismiss and even less reason why the government could not quickly
and decisively prevail.
Moreover, there are ways that a pleading standard change could
decrease the burdens of litigation and increase efficiency. As I have
explained, a defendant’s first real opportunity to challenge the merits of
the case against them is at trial.234 Therefore, although many defendants
plead guilty, the government must prepare for a full dress trial every
time a defendant decides to mount even a narrow defense on the
merits.235 Raising the criminal pleading standard, then, would mean
229 See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522,
533–34 (2007) (“Like surgery, litigation costs a lot because it can be done only by
professional specialists who charge high fees. Parties pay lawyers hundreds of dollars
per hour, so litigation costs depend primarily on how many hours the parties’ lawyers
must devote to the case.” (footnote omitted)).
230 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
231 Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
232 Id. § 3161(h)(1)(H).
233 See Burnham, supra note 10, at 358 (“Most indictments will not involve novel
applications of vague criminal statutes, such that this shift would not affect the bulk of
indictments; there is not much gray about what constitutes bank robbery or drug
possession.”).
234 See supra Section III.C.
235 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 10, at 358; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1610, 1658;
Tierney, supra note 115, at 1860–61; see also supra note 128.
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that defendants who plan to contest their charges could do so without
forcing the government to engage in burdensome trial preparation;
defendants who win at the motion to dismiss stage may never go to trial,
and those who lose might well concede their guilt without a trial.236 In
addition, defendants commonly enter plea discussions with little
information, and although that often benefits prosecutors, it could
potentially lead to protracted and disputed negotiations.237 Raising the
pleading standard to require meaningful information-sharing and to
create a robust motion to dismiss stage would make all parties more
informed about the likelihood of conviction and thereby potentially
streamline plea negotiations.238
Of course, raising the pleading standard and thereby facilitating
more pretrial litigation in criminal cases could burden the defendant.
Filing a pretrial motion, as just noted, pauses the Speedy Trial Act clock,
hence limiting that protection and prolonging the case. If the defendant
were detained, moreover, a motion to dismiss would extend their
pretrial incarceration. Additionally, the more litigation in a criminal
case, the more expensive and resource-intensive it will be to defend.239
But it is generally the defendant’s choice to take on those burdens in
exchange for the possibility of dismissal (or of learning information
about the prosecution’s case).240 And given those burdens, defendants
would likely be disinclined to file motions where a successful result is

236 See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1632–33, 1643–44, 1658; Tierney, supra note
115, at 1860–61, 1864–65.
237 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 164, at 2495; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1632–33,
1643–44.
238 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 164, at 2495; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1632–33,
1643–44; Tierney, supra note 115, at 1864–65. Many of the points applicable to the
government would pertain to courts as well. See supra notes 228–229, 233–236 and
accompanying text; see also Judicial Salary Plan Pay Rates, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/careers/compensation/judiciary-salary-plan-pay-rates
(last updated Jan. 4, 2021).
239 See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 229, at 533–35; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1656–
57.
240 Cf., e.g., United States v. Muresanu, 951 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n
objection to a defective indictment may be waived.”); United States v. Sperrazza, 804
F.3d 1113, 1118–19 (11th Cir. 2015) (similar); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) advisory
committee’s note to 2014 amendment (“Rule 12(b)(3)(B) has also been amended to
remove language that allowed the court at any time while the case is pending to hear a
claim that the ‘indictment or information fails . . . to state an offense.’ . . . The Supreme
Court [has] abandoned any jurisdictional justification for the exception . . . .”). But see
United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1142 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that, in rare
circumstances, an indictment defect can affect jurisdiction); United States v. Moore, 954
F.3d 1322, 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020) (making a similar point and explaining that “a
court can raise [jurisdiction] sua sponte at any time”).
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improbable, meaning that the increase in litigation wrought by a
heightened pleading standard would be limited.241
B. Alignment Is Inappropriate Because Amending Criminal
Pleadings Is Difficult
The second objection, which is related to the first, involves the ease
of amending civil and criminal pleadings. In general, amending a civil
complaint is easy. Under Civil Rule 15, pleadings can be amended once
as a matter of course during a twenty-one-day window early in the case,
and thereafter “with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave,” the latter of which should be “freely give[n] . . . when justice so
requires.”242 But indictments generally cannot be amended unless they
are resubmitted to the grand jury.243 Thus, one could argue that a
heightened pleading standard is acceptable in the civil context because
amendment is not challenging, but such a standard is not feasible in the
criminal context because amendment there is more difficult.
That objection, however, also falls short. First of all, government
attorneys—by their own assertion—are highly competent,244 and they
should have little difficulty writing a sufficiently detailed indictment
under a heightened pleading standard.245 Consequently, a heightened
pleading standard would more likely lead to litigation over the
substance of the case—whether the defendant’s conduct as alleged
supports criminal liability—than to litigation over whether the
government has included enough facts in the indictment. And where the
defendant has not committed a crime, amending the indictment would
often be a futile exercise.
Additionally, in cases where an amendment could allow the
government to maintain a prosecution, the burden of losing a motion to
dismiss would not be excessive—even if resubmission to the grand jury
would be somewhat more onerous than simply amending a civil
complaint. Resubmission would not affect any Speedy Trial Act
241 For indigent defendants, the choice to engage in additional litigation would not
impose financial costs. See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1656–57. But their
appointed attorneys, who may well be “overworked and underfunded” and are
motivated to be efficient in “spending time and resources on representing them,” are
likely to make careful judgments about which motions are worthwhile to file. Id.
242 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)–(2).
243 See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962); see also United States v.
Slough, 679 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2010).
244 See, e.g., U.S. Att’y’s Off. W.D.N.C., Careers: Opportunities for Assistant United States
Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdnc/careers (last updated
Nov. 17, 2021) (“Assistant United States Attorneys are some of the best and the brightest
lawyers in the nation.”).
245 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
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deadlines because a dismissal at the defendant’s behest restarts the
clock.246 Furthermore, in cases where the government has just failed to
allege enough facts, resubmission would merely require submitting a
more detailed description of what the grand jury already found and
asking it to accept that description. In other cases, such as where the
government must meet a new element or an existing element in a
different way, resubmission would necessitate obtaining whatever
evidence was missing and presenting that evidence under a correctly
formulated indictment—but much would likely remain the same. And
of course, the common refrain is that “an effective prosecutor could
convince a grand jury to ‘indict a ham sandwich.’”247 Moreover, there
would be no need for resubmission at all in the roughly 20 percent of
felony cases that are charged by information rather than indictment.248
Thus, a higher criminal pleading standard would not impose a
terrible burden on the government based on the difficulty of amending
indictments. Raising the pleading standard would largely just facilitate
litigation that would not lead to resubmission, and to the extent it did
otherwise, the resulting consequences would be fairly minimal.
C. Alignment Would Require the Revelation of Sensitive
Information
A third objection is that raising the criminal pleading standard
might require the government to reveal sensitive information. The
Advisory Committee raised this argument too, with one member
asserting, “The Department of Justice is reluctant to provide a high level
of specificity in the charging documents that might reveal intelligence

246 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1); United States v. Barraza-Lopez, 659 F.3d 1216,
1218–21 (9th Cir. 2011).
247 United States v. Kubini, 19 F. Supp. 3d 579, 617 n.25 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1195 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc); see also Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Instances in
which grand juries refuse to return indictments at the request of the prosecutor are
almost as rare as hen’s teeth.”). Therefore, even if, for example, the original grand jury’s
term ended before the dismissal of the indictment, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g) (setting a
grand jury term at eighteen months, with a possible six-month extension), it should
usually not be too significant a hurdle for the prosecutor to present their case anew to a
successor grand jury (especially since materials from one grand jury can be shared with
successor grand juries, see id. R. 6(e)(3)(C)).
248 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(e); FY 2010 - 2018 Defendants Charged in Criminal Cases,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/var.cfm?ttype=trends&agency=
AOUSC&db_type=CrimCtCases&saf=IN.
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means and methods.”249 And that argument could easily extend to other
information, such as investigatory sources and witnesses.250
To be sure, too high a pleading standard, such as one that required
naming witnesses, identifying sources, or revealing methods of
obtaining evidence might warrant such concerns. But Twombly and
Iqbal do not establish such a standard. Indeed, it is well-established that
those decisions do not require plaintiffs to “plead evidence,” as in
describe how the factual allegations will be proved.251 Rather, they only
necessitate alleging the facts as the complaining party asserts them to be.
As the Fourth Circuit has explained:
Iqbal and Twombly do not require a plaintiff to prove his case
in the complaint. The requirement of nonconclusory factual
detail at the pleading stage is tempered by the recognition that
a plaintiff may only have so much information at his disposal
at the outset. A “complaint need not ‘make a case’ against a
defendant or ‘forecast evidence sufficient to prove an element’
of the claim. It need only ‘allege facts sufficient to state
elements’ of the claim.”252
In short, no amplification of the criminal pleading system comparable to
the Twombly-Iqbal standard would require the government to reveal
how it developed its factual allegations.253
Furthermore, the level of detail Twombly and Iqbal anticipate is not
so significant that those decisions (or something similar), applied to the
criminal context, would often lead to indirectly revealing sensitive
U.S. CTS., supra note 80, at 21.
Cf. Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1647–48 (discussing the concern that a defendant
could use discovery tools “to tamper with witnesses and interfere with investigations”);
Meyn, supra note 71, at 1127 (similar); Meyn, supra note 10, at 86 (noting potential
“concerns about the release of highly sensitive information” in revamping criminal
procedure); Morvillo et al., supra note 44, at 176 (observing the existence of “judicial
attitudes that it is risky to give the defendant too much information”).
251 See, e.g., Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Est. Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012);
Peñalbert–Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011); In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 325 n.25 (3d Cir. 2010); Read v. Corning Inc.,
371 F. Supp. 3d 87, 92 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Brown v. Collections Bureau of Am., Ltd., 183 F.
Supp. 3d 1004, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
252 Robertson, 679 F.3d at 291 (citation omitted).
253 Indeed, it is worth noting that, even under the stricter “code pleading” system that
Civil Rule 8(a) repudiated, pleading evidence was unnecessary. See, e.g., CHARLES E.
CLARK, CLARK ON CODE PLEADING 225 (2d ed. 1947); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES:
REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION ACCORDING TO THE REFORMED AMERICAN
PROCEDURE – A TREATISE ADAPTED TO USE IN ALL THE STATES AND TERRITORIES WHERE THAT
SYSTEM PREVAILS § 420 (5th ed. 1929); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 486 (2010); Hintz, supra note 1, at 647–48, 668, 676;
Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint: Common Law—Codes—
Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 899, 912 (1961).
249
250
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information about witnesses, investigative methods, or the like. The
Supreme Court has expressly said that Twombly and Iqbal “do[] not
require ‘detailed factual allegations.’”254 And courts regularly assert
that those decisions do not demand especially much.255 Rather, they
only require complaints to “answer the basic questions: who, did what,
to whom (or with whom), where, and when”—without relying on
“formulaic recitations and ‘conclusory statement[s]’”—to such a degree
that the claim is “plausible.”256 In other words, all raising the pleading
standard would do is require narrative detail about the alleged crime
rather than purely conclusory statements, and government attorneys
could certainly provide that without giving away too much.257
Finally, there are mechanisms available to the government for
avoiding the harms of revealing sensitive information. First of all,
Criminal Rule 6(e)(4) gives district courts broad discretion to seal an
indictment “until the defendant is in custody or has been released
pending trial,” when doing so “is in the public interest or serves a
legitimate law-enforcement purpose.”258 Further, threatening or
intimidating witnesses is itself a federal crime.259 Moreover, defendants
who are not detained pretrial are always released subject to the

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Agredano v. State Farm Lloyds, 975 F.3d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 2020);
Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2013).
256 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t,
770 F.3d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); accord
Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 709 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In fact,
Twombly and Iqbal may not even require that much. See United States ex rel. Presser v.
Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Under Rule 8, a
plaintiff only needs to ‘give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to
present a story that holds together.’ Alternatively, under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff ‘alleging
fraud or mistake . . . must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake.’ A plaintiff ordinarily must describe the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’
of the fraud—‘the first paragraph of any newspaper story.’” (citations omitted)).
257 Some decisions have suggested that conclusory allegations would not be
insufficient if the method of discovery of the asserted facts were alleged. See, e.g.,
Marenco v. Mercy Hous., Case No. 18-cv-03599-LB, 2018 WL 4008405, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
July 27, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4005385, at *1 (Aug. 20, 2018); Fields v. Tex. Dep’t of
State Health Servs., CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-607-ALM-CAN, 2017 WL 9287010, at *4
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 4684003, at *9 (Oct. 9, 2017); Cranford v.
Ahlin, No. 1:11-cv-01199-GBC, 2012 WL 3912762, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012). To the
extent these decisions suggest that Rule 8(a) requires revealing a factual assertion’s
method of discovery, they are out of alignment with the prevailing standards set forth
above. And to the extent they simply indicate that revealing the method of discovery is
one way of making allegations less speculative or conclusory, such a rule, in the criminal
context, would not require the government to reveal sensitive information.
258 United States v. Ellis, 622 F.3d 784, 792 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(4)).
259 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512; Meyn, supra note 71, at 1127.
254
255
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condition that they “not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during
the period of release,” and they may be released subject to the condition
that they “avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with
a potential witness who may testify concerning the offense.”260 Those
conditions, in turn, are punishable by “a revocation of release, an order
of detention, and a prosecution for contempt of court,” and in addition,
crimes committed while on release themselves receive a significant
sentencing enhancement.261 Additionally, one of the key factors courts
must consider in deciding whether (and under what conditions) to
release a defendant pending trial is “the nature and seriousness of the
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the
person’s release,”262 and threatening or intimidating witnesses counsels
significantly in favor of detention.263 And pretrial detention, of course,
reduces defendants’ ability to intimidate witnesses by physically
restricting their movement and limiting their “ability to communicate
with the outside world.”264 Also, witnesses may be directly protected by
a range of mechanisms, from protective orders to the Witness Security
Program.265 Lastly, the government can seek to limit public access to the
charging document if the limitation is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.266 Protecting secret information or
witnesses may well fall into that category.267

18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(c).
Id. §§ 3142, 3147–48(a).
262 Id. § 3142(g)(4).
263 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Perez-Valentin, No. CRIM. 04-133(SEC), 2004 WL 725361, at *1 (D.P.R. Mar. 26, 2004).
264 Meyn, supra note 71, at 1127.
265 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-21.000 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-21000-witness-security#9-21.0101; Gold et al.,
supra note 10, at 1648; Meyn, supra note 71, at 1127.
266 See, e.g., United States v. Konrad, Criminal Action No. 11-15, 2011 WL 1549494, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2011).
267 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980); United States v.
Index Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1090 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Moussaoui,
65 F. App’x 881, 887 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cousins, 858 F. Supp. 2d 614, 618
(E.D. Va. 2012); United States v. Medunjanin, 10 CR 19 1 (RJD), 2012 WL 13186383, at
*1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012); United States v. Suppressed, Nos. 4:08MJ1195 TIA,
4:08MJ1196 TIA, 4:08MJ1197 TIA, 4:08MJ1204 TIA, 2010 WL 4962885, at *4–5 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 22, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 4962876, at *3–4 (Dec. 1, 2010); United States v.
Ketner, 566 F. Supp. 2d 568, 586 (W.D. Tex. 2008); Mary Jo White, Symposium, Secrecy
and the Criminal Justice System, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 18 (2000).
260
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D. Alignment Would Let the Guilty Go Free
A fourth potential objection—largely drawn from concerns related
to heightened pleading requirements in civil cases—is that raising the
pleading standard could lead to the dismissal of meritorious cases and
therefore let factually guilty defendants go free.268 Indeed, one might
contend that not only would a higher pleading standard make
proceeding to trial more difficult, but also it could give more teeth to
constructive amendment and variance challenges.269 Yet this objection
too is unpersuasive.
Much of the criticism on this point on the civil side involves the
concern that plaintiffs do not possess enough information to meet the
Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard until they engage in discovery, which
they cannot do until after meeting that standard.270 That is not a
problem for prosecutors, however, who have substantial pre-pleading
investigatory powers and should be close to trial-ready at the pleading
stage.271
Others fault Twombly and Iqbal in civil cases because they give
judges too little guidance and too much discretion.272 But that also is
less of a concern in the criminal context. Discretion should only matter
when the factual allegations are at the margin of the pleading standard,
but government attorneys should have little difficulty going beyond the
margin. And questions about the prosecution’s legal theory leave no
room for discretion.273
Further, although a heightened pleading standard would increase
the “bite” of constructive amendment and variance challenges, that
would not allow the guilty to go free. To start, it should not be hard for

Cf., e.g., Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to
Understand and Overcome the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 1, 21
(2014) (describing plaintiff access-to-justice critiques of heightened pleading in civil
cases); Percy, supra note 86, at 233 (same).
269 See supra Section III.E.
270 See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal,
68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 372 (2016); Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1644; Weinberg, Applying
Twombly, supra note 10, at 51; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 30–31.
271 See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1202 (D. Utah 2019);
Burnham, supra note 10, at 360–61; Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1644; Meyn, supra note
10, at 56; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 10, at 51; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note
10, at 30–31; supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
272 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading
Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 256–
57 (2011–12).
273 Cf., e.g., Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 (2014)
(“Traditionally, decisions on ‘questions of law’ are ‘reviewable de novo.’” (citation
omitted)).
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prosecutors to comply with the constructive amendment and variance
rules under such a pleading standard. The boundaries of the case would
be narrower, but those boundaries would also be clearer—and
established by the government itself based on the indictment it drafted
and the evidence it presented to the grand jury. Thus, prosecutors
should be fully capable of navigating those boundaries at trial.
Additionally, and in any event, a successful challenge on constructive
amendment or variance grounds generally does not bar retrial.274
Hence, such a challenge would not prevent bringing the guilty to justice.
Finally, there is one significant way in which raising the pleading
standard would reduce the likelihood that guilty defendants would go
free. Currently, the first real chance for a defendant to contest the case
against them is at trial.275 If, at that stage, the jury or court concludes
that the prosecution’s evidence does not support criminal liability, then
the government would lose, either by way of jury verdict or motion for
a judgment of acquittal.276 In such a circumstance, the government is
generally not permitted to prosecute the defendant again for the
charged offense or even appeal the adverse decision (if there is no guilty
verdict that can be reinstated),277 even if the decision is erroneous and
even if the government could have proved its case under the jury or
court’s understanding of the law. Moreover, re-prosecution is also
prohibited if the defendant successfully appeals a conviction on
sufficiency of the evidence grounds.278
As mentioned above, however, a decision that the charging
document is defective does not bar re-prosecution, and the government
can appeal such a decision.279 Accordingly, if the court believes that the
government’s facts, as alleged, are insufficient to support a conviction,
the court could dismiss the indictment well before trial, and the
government could either reindict in line with the court’s understanding
of the law or clarify the law by seeking an appeal. Because the
prosecution would then be proceeding with a more defined
understanding of what must be proved, a finding of evidentiary

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 891 F.3d 1220, 1238 (10th Cir. 2018); United
States v. Szpyt, 785 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2015).
275 See supra Section III.C.
276 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
277 See, e.g., United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Shelley, 405 F.3d 1195, 1199–1200 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Alvarez,
351 F.3d 126, 129–30 (4th Cir. 2003); Burnham, supra note 10, at 349–50; Tierney,
supra note 115, at 1842, 1862–63.
278 See, e.g., United States v. Bobo, 419 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005).
279 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
274
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insufficiency despite factual guilt would be less likely, and the
probability of conviction would increase.280
E. Alignment Is Unnecessary
A final objection to raising the criminal pleading standard—albeit
one that questions the benefits of such a change instead of raising an
affirmative concern—is that doing so is unnecessary in light of all the
other protections criminal defendants possess.281 After all, the
Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard reflects the need to protect
defendants from the burdens of civil discovery, but “the filing of a
criminal indictment . . . does not provide the government with the broad
discovery powers granted by the federal civil rules,” and “the limited
discovery rights granted by the federal criminal rules belong primarily
to the defendant, not to the government.”282 Further, unlike civil
defendants, criminal defendants are protected by the grand jury283 and
the reasonable doubt standard,284 and “if a defendant has serious
apprehension about his ability to prepare a defense in light of the
charges against him, he can seek a bill of particulars.”285
That objection, however, is as unavailing as the others. Although
civil discovery is much more onerous than criminal discovery, which
generally involves limited disclosures to the defendant, the foregoing
discussion makes clear that there are other reasons to impose a
heightened pleading standard in the criminal context apart from
avoiding the burdens of discovery. Moreover, neither the grand jury,
nor the reasonable doubt standard, nor the bill of particulars is
sufficient to obviate the need for a heightened pleading standard. As
explained above, the grand jury is not much of a protection.286 In
Cf., e.g., Tierney, supra note 115, at 1841–42, 1862–63.
See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Bundy, Case No. 2:16-cr-00046-PAL-GMN, 2017 WL 387204, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 11,
2017), adopted, 2018 WL 523352, at *1 (Jan. 23, 2018); United States v. Coley, Case No.
CR415-187, 2016 WL 743432, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 1032876,
at *1 (Mar. 14, 2016); United States v. Castillo Madrigal, 12-cr-62-bbc-04, 2013 WL
12099089, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 28, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 12099088, at *1 (Feb. 21,
2013); cf. Meyn, supra note 71, at 1135–36 (discussing the concern that defendants
already possess enough rights in the context of arguing for expanded defense discovery
tools).
282 Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *3.
283 See Bundy, 2017 WL 387204, at *6; Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *3; Castillo
Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089, at *2.
284 See Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *3.
285 Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 926.
286 See supra notes 102–109 and accompanying text; see also Castillo Madrigal, 2013
WL 12099089, at *2 (“True, cynics view federal grand juries as rubber stamps for the
prosecution.”).
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addition, the reasonable doubt standard is only as useful as the
opportunity to challenge the case at trial or any other trial right; it is
primarily helpful just to those few defendants who decline to plead
guilty and bear the costs and risks occasioned by that choice.287 Finally,
although a defendant can obtain a bill of particulars, that mechanism, as
we have seen, is not especially impactful.288 And civil defendants have
access to a very similar mechanism—the motion for a more definite
statement—yet also have the benefit of Twombly and Iqbal.289
Overall, raising the criminal pleading standard is far from
unnecessary. The reasons for doing so may differ somewhat from the
reasons for raising the civil pleading standard, but those reasons are no
less potent. And criminal defendants are not so otherwise protected
that raising the criminal pleading standard would be superfluous.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that policy and normative
considerations counsel strongly in favor of raising the criminal pleading
standard to at least align with the civil pleading standard. And while
that conclusion is significant in its own right, several implications are
important and worth noting.
First, this Article’s conclusion confirms that the prevailing balance
between our civil and criminal pleading standards is deeply misguided
and should be rethought. As explained above, my previous research
reveals that that balance is questionable as a matter of law, meaning
that, if we are to retain it, it should at least be strongly supported by
normative arguments. The fact that it is not so supported—and indeed,
that the normative considerations cut in the other direction—make
plain the error of our existing pleading regime and the powerful need
for change.
Second, it demonstrates a need for change at a time when there is
broad popular support for criminal justice reform. Past years have seen
strong and bipartisan support for such reform,290 and the recent
See Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1611–12, 1621–22; supra notes 118–121 and
accompanying text; supra Section III.F.
288 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
289 See Hintz, supra note 1, at 686–87.
290 See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS-AEI WORKING GRP. ON CRIM. JUST. REFORM, A BETTER PATH
FORWARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4–5 (2021), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2021/04/Better-Path-Forward_Brookings-AEI-report.pdf; Lauren M. Ouziel,
Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523, 525–26, 551–
52 (2020); Courtney Black, Note, Mental-Health Courts: Expanding the Model in an Era of
Criminal Justice Reform, 63 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 299, 301–02 (2020); Colleen Long &
Hannah Fingerhut, AP-NORC Poll: Nearly All in US Back Criminal Justice Reform,
287
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heartbreaking and prominent killings of members of the Black
community by law enforcement have justifiably amplified calls for
change.291 What is more, the public’s interest in reform is not limited to
particular changes, but rather extends broadly to many aspects of the
justice system.292 In addition, the Biden administration has adopted
wide-ranging goals for criminal justice reform,293 and Congress has
made bipartisan efforts to implement federal measures for improving
the system.294 Thus, if there is a time when amending the criminal

ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 23, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/police-us-news-ap-topnews-politics-kevin-richardson-ffaa4bc564afcf4a90b02f455d8fdf03.
291 See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS-AEI WORKING GRP. ON CRIM. JUST. REFORM, supra note 290, at
5; Tal Axelrod, Lawmakers Call for Action on First Anniversary of Breonna Taylor’s Death,
THE HILL (Mar. 13, 2021, 2:05 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/543074lawmakers-call-for-action-on-first-anniversary-of-breonna-taylors-death?rl=1; Mark
Berman & Tom Jackman, After a Summer of Protest, Americans Voted for Policing and
Criminal Justice Changes, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/national/criminal-justice-election/2020/11/13/20186380-25d6-11eb-8672c281c7a2c96e_story.html.
292 See, e.g., PEW RSCH. CTR., MAJORITY OF PUBLIC FAVORS GIVING CIVILIANS THE POWER TO SUE
POLICE OFFICERS FOR MISCONDUCT 1–2, 4, 9–11, 15 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
politics/2020/07/09/majority-of-public-favors-giving-civilians-the-power-to-suepolice-officers-for-misconduct/; Paul Heaton, Enhanced Public Defense Improves Pretrial
Outcomes and Reduces Racial Disparities, 96 IND. L.J. 701, 706 (2021); Chris Jackson, As
Public Safety Tops the Agenda, Americans Want Both Order and Justice, IPSOS (July 8,
2021), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/usa-today-crime-and-safety-2021;
Dawn Milam & Sean McElwee, Poll: Voters Support Broad Reforms to Scope of Police Work
and Accountability After Chauvin Verdict, THE APPEAL (Apr. 28, 2021), https://
theappeal.org/the-lab/polling-memos/voters-support-broad-reforms-to-scope-ofpolice-work-and-accountability-after-chauvin-verdict/; Press Release, Senate Comm.
on Judiciary, Poll Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Support Prison, Sentencing
Reforms (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/pollshows-americans-overwhelmingly-support-prison-sentencing-reforms.
293 See, e.g., The Biden Plan for Strengthening America’s Commitment to Justice,
JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/justice/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2021); Claudia Lauer,
Prosecutors Push Biden to Prioritize Criminal Justice Reform, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 17,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-health-coronavirus-pandemic-policereform-1b9023c795343c7b1c11b14263f0737d; Michael Crowley, Biden’s Budget Steps
Up Spending for Criminal Justice Reform, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 25, 2021), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/bidens-budget-steps-spendingcriminal-justice-reform.
294 See, e.g., Marianne Levine, As Police Reform Talks Sputter, Bipartisan Criminal
Justice Bills Advance, POLITICO (July 1, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/
2021/07/01/democrats-eager-replicate-trump-achievement-497276; Walter Pavlo,
New Bill Aims to Upgrade Camera Systems in Federal Prison for More Accountability,
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2021/10/21/
federal-prisons-are-about-to-have-more-cameras/?sh=7cba1f07fe67; Press Release,
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Senate Judiciary Committee Advances Two Bipartisan
Durbin, Grassley Criminal Justice Bills (June 10, 2021), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/senate-judiciary-committee-advancestwo-bipartisan-durbin-grassley-criminal-justice-bills; Criminal Justice Reform, ABA (Oct.
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pleading standard might receive public and political support, it is now,
and this Article’s conclusion could help to spark enthusiasm for such a
change.
Third, this Article’s conclusion may help to persuade the primary
authorities in control of the Federal Rules of Procedure to effect
reform—despite the entrenched nature of the current pleading regime.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, which oversees the
Advisory Committees on the Federal Rules and ultimately proposes Rule
changes to the Supreme Court, necessarily considers policy
arguments.295 The Conference “is the national policy-making body for
the federal courts,”296 and it is supposed to consider changes to the Rules
based on the policy-oriented factors of “promot[ing] simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of
litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”297
Indeed, in rejecting the 2016 proposal to amend the criminal pleading
standard, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules expressly relied on
policy arguments (albeit ones that have been refuted here).298
Moreover, the federal courts, whether rightly or wrongly, actively
invoke such arguments in interpreting, and even reinterpreting, the
Federal Rules. In Twombly, for instance, the Supreme Court—despite
acknowledging that altering the Federal Rules “can only be
accomplished by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation”299—relied heavily on practical considerations
regarding the costs of discovery in amplifying Rule 8(a)’s pleading
requirements and reversing half a century of pleading precedent.300
Thus, the conclusion that normative considerations offer compelling
support for changing the pleading standard could (and should) convince
the relevant authorities to take action. That is especially so given the

27, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/
publications/washingtonletter/october-2021-wl/cjreform-1021wl/.
295 See 28 U.S.C. § 331; How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
296 Governance & the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/aboutfederal-courts/governance-judicial-conference (emphasis added) (last visited Dec. 13,
2021).
297 28 U.S.C. § 331.
298 See U.S. CTS., supra note 80, at 19–21.
299 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
300 See, e.g., id. at 559; Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 987, 1004 (2012); Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 10, at 50;
Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 10, at 31.
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widespread interest in reform and the fact that our pleading balance is
questionable as a matter of law and policy.
Lastly, and more generally, the conclusion that policy
considerations favor changing the criminal pleading standard reflects,
in line with a growing body of research, the fact that the justice system
is often far less protective of criminal defendants than civil ones.301 That
balance of protections would be quite troubling at any time, but it is
unfathomable in an era so attentive to the criminal justice system. And
although raising the criminal pleading standard to at least align with the
civil standard is one easy and potent way to start addressing that issue,
it is far from the only one.302 Accordingly, this Article’s conclusion offers
support for eliminating imbalances in criminal and civil justice that
favor civil defendants, and for answering society’s calls for reform, at
least in part, with proposals drawn from the civil litigation sphere.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the existing federal pleading regime, conclusory pleadings
are forbidden in civil cases, but they are welcomed and encouraged in
criminal cases. As this Article shows, however, normative and policy
considerations teach that the time has come for change. Raising the
criminal pleading standard to at least align with the civil standard would
generate a host of important benefits for criminal defendants and our
criminal justice system, and there would be few, if any, downsides. And
given that the balance in our pleading standards is also questionable as
a matter of law, there is little reason to keep things as they are.

See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1608–14; Meyn, supra note 10, at 39–41.
See, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 10, at 1608–14, 1640–56; Leonetti, supra note 60,
at 668–69; Meyn, supra note 71, at 1092–93; Morvillo et al., supra note 44, at 173–76;
Ortman, supra note 225, at 1099–1102.
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